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AICGS is pleased to present the written results of the third and final year of its project “A German-
American Dialogue of the Next Generation: Global Responsibility, Joint Engagement.” The six
authors together with several other young Americans and Germans engaged with each other during the
course of 2018-2019 in discussions to identify solutions to global issues of concern for the transatlantic
relationship. The purpose of the project is to emphasize the important role of the next generation of
transatlantic leaders and experts and to give them a platform and voice in the critical dialogue of crucial
global issues that require joint transatlantic attention and solutions.  
The project participants come from a variety of disciplines and have a wide array of expertise.
Representing the three AICGS program areas—Foreign & Domestic Policy; Geoeconomics; and Society,
Culture & Politics—the participants formulated a set of recommendations that were presented in a
variety of venues and through innovative means. The essays presented in this Policy Report summarize
the outcome of a year-long engagement with current critical transatlantic issues, which include challenges
and opportunities related to the digital transformation, the future of work and education of the workforce,
the rise of China as a global player, the growing influence of Russia, populism, the energy transition,
European defense capabilities, transatlantic security cooperation, the inclusion of minority and immigrant
populations, as well as the role of civil society in strengthening the transatlantic alliance.
The project’s goal has been to highlight the perspectives of the next generation of transatlanticists and
to broaden the public debate about important issues. Digital media form a crucial element of the project.
With frequent blogs, virtual meetings, tweets, and videos, AICGS is targeting new and established
generations in order to draw them into the fold of the transatlantic circle.  The project ultimately hopes
to contribute to maintaining and expanding the transatlantic bond between the United States and
Germany during and beyond a period of fraught relations. AICGS is grateful to this year’s participants
for their enthusiasm and engagement as well as their innovative and creative contributions, which have
made this project such a success. For more information about the program, please visit the AICGS
website at https://www.aicgs.org/project/a-german-american-dialogue-of-the-next-generation-2018-
2019/. 
AICGS is grateful to the Transatlantic Program of the Federal Republic of Germany with Funds through
the European Recovery Program (ERP) of the Federal Ministry for Economics and Energy (BMWi) for
its generous support of this program. In addition, AICGS was pleased to be able to include the third year
of the project in the “Deutschlandjahr USA” initiative of the German Federal Foreign Office.
Susanne Dieper
Director of Programs and Grants
AICGS
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of modern Germany from the end of World War II to the 1980s. His current project, Oppressing the
Majority, is a contribution to the history of the global phenomenon of populism. It explores the trajectory
of an argument that simultaneously emerged in Western Europe and the United States in the late 1960s
and early 1970s, namely that a number of different actors, including political elites, activists, and the
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When the American Institute for Contemporary
German Studies invited me last summer to partici-
pate in the project “A Transatlantic Dialogue of the
Next Generation,” I agreed immediately, for both
personal and academic reasons.1 I had grown up
in Munich, where I attended the Ludwigs-
Maximilians Universität, before a Fulbright fellow-
ship allowed me to complete an M.A. degree at
Columbia University. After a year back in Germany,
I returned to the United States in 2004 to pursue a
PhD in history at the University of North Carolina
at Chapel Hill. I am now teaching twentieth century
German and European history at Duquesne
University in Pittsburgh. To date, I have lived in the
United States for fifteen years. 
In addition, the focus of my work is transatlantic.
My first book, History after Hitler, explored the
emergence and flourishing of a post-World War II
transatlantic intellectual community of historians,
and revealed the extent to which these scholars’
work resulted in a nuanced understanding of
German history in both Germany and the United
States. My current project, Oppressing the Majority,
analyzes the trajectory of an argument that
emerged in Western Europe and the United States
in the late 1960s and early 1970s: that political
elites, activists, and the media were succeeding in
choking the voices of a “silent majority.” Ultimately,
this project offers a transnational contribution to the
history of contemporary populism.
Attending the conferences hosted by AICGS has
been an immensely rewarding experience, as I was
able to learn from colleagues in other disciplines
such as political science, economics, and law. Yet
to me, one set of issues remained glaringly absent:
First, what is it that transatlanticists believe
German-American relations should aim for? What
values are to guide these relations? And second, if
the common denominator, often invoked, is the
“liberal democratic order,” then how exactly do we
define that order? 
Having listened to my fellow experts in the course
of the past year, I have become increasingly
convinced that proponents of a close transatlantic
partnership have to articulate much more clearly
what they believe its goals are. Once we have
decided this crucial question, we will be in a better
position to engage citizens on both sides of the
Atlantic; certainly the ones who are uninterested in
or indifferent to these matters, but perhaps even
those who are hostile. Clarifying the stakes and the
terms will also allow us to get beyond the defensive
position in which transatlanticists have found them-
selves lately.  It will help them to “shift the narrative,”
which was one of the primary tasks identified by
the Foreign & Domestic Policy Group of this year’s
Transatlantic Dialogue of a New Generation.
The following essay first offers some observations
on the longer-term trajectory of German-American
relations. It then focuses on the current challenges
for a closer cooperation of the two countries, before
offering some suggestions on how to improve the
transatlantic partnership, in particular in the face of
the populist wave on both sides of the Atlantic.
Transatlantic Relations after the Cold
War
In 2012, historian Mary Nolan published her magis-
terial study The Transatlantic Century on the rela-
tions between Europe and the United States from
the last decade of the nineteenth to the first decade
7
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of the twenty-first century.2 Nolan entitled the last
two chapters, which dealt with the decades
following the end of the Cold War, “A Widening
Atlantic” and “Imperial America, Estranged
Europe.” This seems surprising, because in light of
the “unipolar moment” (Charles Krauthammer) of
the 1990s, the economic problems of many
European states during the same decade, and the
failure of the European Union to respond
adequately to the Balkan wars, one might have
expected a subsequent inclusion of European
states into a world order dominated by the United
States.
Yet this did not come to pass. In Nolan’s words,
“the ensuing two decades [between the end of the
Cold War and the publication of her book] were
less a story of convergence and cooperation
between Europe and the United States, than of
divergence, disagreement, and at times overt
hostility.”3 This divergence manifested itself in the
domestic arena, where the United States embraced
neoliberalism and deregulation, whereas much of
Europe, and certainly Germany, despite cutbacks
of the welfare state, remained generally committed
to a social market economy. In the international
arena, the United States assumed a more inter-
ventionist and unilateral stance, while for German
foreign policymakers this was neither desirable nor
possible.
In light of Nolan’s analysis, one might ask if the
current tensions between Europe and the United
States and between Germany and the United
States are thus only a continuation and intensifica-
tion of the trend emerging in the last three decades.
Without a doubt, this period has seen a realignment
of interests on both sides of the Atlantic. While the
focus of American foreign policy shifted away from
Europe and thus Germany, and toward Asia and
South America, post-unification Germany has
struggled (and is still struggling) to find its interna-
tional role. As Andrew Port has suggested, the
major shortcoming of German foreign policy during
the last three decades has been its erratic nature.4
In particular, Germany’s abstention during the UN
Security Council’s 2011 vote on the resolution to
authorize force in order to remove the Libyan
dictator Muammar Qaddafi illustrated this problem-
atic tendency. Just as symptomatic as Chancellor
Angela Merkel’s and foreign minister Guido
Westerwelle’s assertion that abstention did not
equal neutrality on this issue was an opinion survey
conducted at the time: It revealed that 62 percent
of Germans favored the use of force against
Qaddafi, yet only 29 percent thought that their
government should commit German troops for that
purpose.5 While it is understandable that German
history in the first half of the twentieth century
continues to weigh on its political elites and public
alike, Germany’s allies are justly frustrated by the
resulting indecisive nature of the country’s foreign
policy. Perhaps the outcry over former federal pres-
ident Horst Köhler’s 2010 comments on Germany’s
national interests and a possible military deploy-
ment to assert them could have offered an oppor-
tunity for a broader debate on what exactly its
national interests are or should be. This debate has
yet to happen.
To a lesser degree, the personal relationships of
German and American leaders have mattered for
the two countries’ relations as well—and not just
recently. In the late 1970s, the self-declared “realist”
and managerial West German chancellor Helmut
Schmidt had little sympathy for what he regarded
as the misguided foreign policy idealism of U.S.
president Jimmy Carter. Instead, Schmidt made it
clear that he would have much preferred to
continue working with Carter’s Republican prede-
cessor Gerald Ford.6 On the other hand, President
George H.W. Bush’s good personal relationship
with Chancellor Helmut Kohl certainly helped to
make the United States an early supporter of
German unification, which was crucial for the Kohl
government in light of the serious concerns voiced
especially by the British prime minister Margaret
Thatcher.7
A general factor complicating transatlantic relations
is the difficulty on both sides of the Atlantic to
comprehend the differences between the respec-
tive political systems. And especially in Germany,
even many media observers still lack a proper
understanding of the degree to which American
society has been divided at least since the 1990s
(though some historians argue that the current
divide has its roots in the 1960s8). As a result,
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Germans continue to be surprised when an
American president enjoying immense popularity
in Germany (Bill Clinton, Barack Obama) is
succeeded by one seeming to confirm all anti-
American stereotypes (George W. Bush, Donald
Trump). 
Much of the German news coverage of U.S.
domestic politics also tends to underestimate the
increasing unwillingness of the Republican Party
to respect electoral outcomes. When the party lost
the governor’s races in North Carolina in 2016 and
in Wisconsin in 2018, Republican-controlled state
legislatures passed a series of laws severely
curtailing the powers of the incoming Democratic
governors.9 In their recent study “How
Democracies Die,” political scientists Daniel Ziblatt
and Steven Levitsky emphasize the importance of
mutual toleration and institutional forbearance to
ensure the functioning of a democratic political
system.10 Mutual toleration, according to Ziblatt
and Levitsky, refers to the idea that political rivals
observe constitutional rules and recognize each
other’s equal right to compete for political power
and to govern. The Republican Party has lately
signaled their increasing unwillingness on the
federal as well as on the state level to do just that. 
The long-standing practice of gerrymandering
belongs in a similar category. While historically both
Democrats and Republicans have resorted to this
tool in order to secure their majorities, it currently
favors the Republicans on the federal as well as
many state levels.11 For example, in the 2018 elec-
tions, Democrats earned 48 percent of the popular
vote in North Carolina House races (as opposed to
the Republican 51 percent), but won only three
seats (as opposed to the Republican nine seats),
with one seat still undecided. Similarly, in Ohio
Republicans earned 52 percent of the popular vote,
but twelve out of sixteen seats in the House of
Representatives.12
Institutional forbearance, the second norm Levitsky
and Ziblatt deem critical for democracy’s survival,
refers to the avoidance of actions that violate the
spirit of a law while respecting its letter. During the
second term of George W. Bush, half of the
Democratic senators voted for John Roberts and a
few for Samuel Alito, whereas during the second
term of President Obama, the Republican Senate
majority leader Mitch McConnell, in an unprece-
dented fashion, prevented a confirmation hearing
of the president’s Supreme Court nominee Merrick
Garland.13
Why does all this matter, not only for the health of
American democracy, but also for transatlantic rela-
tions? German transatlanticists need to recognize
more clearly the consequences of Republican
extremism for the German-American partnership.
It seems exceedingly difficult to find common
values and to credibly work for a “liberal democratic
order” with representatives of the current U.S.
administration. After all, it is run by a party with a
growing record of actions violating long-standing
democratic norms and of vilifying independent
news media. Instead, transatlanticists should focus
their attention even more on those political actors
in the United States who still adhere to these
norms—and they do exist, across the entire political
spectrum. This could serve the additional purpose
of reminding Germans of the diversity and the
resilience of American civil society, which they tend
to lose sight of, in light of the rhetoric and the poli-
cies of the U.S. administration, whether Trumpian
nationalist isolationism or Boltonian aggressive
interventionism.
The Liberal Democratic Order
A fundamental problem in the transatlanticist
discourse is the lack of terminological precision: it
is by no means clear what exactly we are talking
about when we emphasize the common values that
are threatened by populist forces on both sides of
the Atlantic. Sometimes a “liberal democratic order”
is the invoked entity, but without a clear articulation
of what kind of liberalism this order entails. Do we
define it as liberalism in the current American parl-
ance (which is of course also not a very clearly
demarcated term, either)? Or do we understand
liberalism in its classic sense, combining laissez-
faire economics with civil liberties? The unspoken
assumption in transatlanticist circles appears to be
that there is a general consensus on core ideals.
The author of this essay has gained a different
impression in the course of the Transatlantic
9
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Dialogue project. The recommendation would
therefore be to make the assumed consensus itself
a topic of discussion. 
For example, what is the place of free trade within
the liberal democratic order? Few if any proponents
of close transatlantic relations are economic protec-
tionists, but differences exist when it comes to the
issue of consumer protection (and the bodies
responsible for it), labor standards, and other
areas, as the Transatlantic Trade and Investment
Partnership (TTIP) negotiations have made abun-
dantly clear. And outside of the transatlanticist
milieu, protectionism enjoys increased popularity.  
It appears that the only uncontested aspects of the
liberal democratic order are civil liberties including
freedom of the press. If that is indeed the case,
what do we make of the fact that this part of the
liberal democratic order is currently under attack in
both the United States and in Germany, with the
significant difference that in Germany, the fringe
party Alternative for Germany (AfD) is at the fore-
front of a wholesale defamation of the media,
whereas in the United States its proponents include
high-ranking members of the administration,
including the president himself.
Transatlantic organizations should play a more
vocal role in these matters. The American Council
on Germany, for example, states that “during this
time of global tumult and significant challenges [it
is] dedicated to honing a new narrative for the
German-American relationship—one that compels
us to build on our past cooperation through new
perspectives and innovative approaches.” It also
emphasizes that “ensuring open societies with
close ties across borders” constitutes one of its
current goals.14 Similarly, its German counterpart
Atlantik-Brücke asserts: “now that nationalist
tendencies are gaining support around the globe,
Atlantik-Brücke remains even more committed to
its mission. It supports open societies, multilateri-
alism, and free trade.”15 Therefore, if an open
society or multilateralism is under attack in either
Germany or the United States, transatlantic organ-
izations should be more vocal in their defense. 
Of course, it is evident why transatlantic organiza-
tions have traditionally emphasized their non-
partisan orientation. They rely, after all, on contacts
to the respective governments and can ill afford to
antagonize them. Yet non-partisan can certainly not
mean devoid of specific political values, and in this
author’s opinion, the almost exclusive focus on
policy obscures the underlying values guiding those
policies. A much more forceful articulation of the
benefits of these values is needed now more than
it has been in decades, as not only the U.S. admin-
istration, but also many citizens on both sides of
the Atlantic are no longer supportive of them. 
The Populist Challenge
Insufficient terminological precision is also a
problem affecting transatlantic debates on
populism. Too many media analyses have been
grouping a number of very different parties and
non-party movements into the same populist cate-
gory. In fact, some historians and social scientists
have argued for abandoning the term altogether, in
light of its inflationary usage. Terminological impre-
cision may also be one of the reasons for the diffi-
culties of establishment political parties to respond
to the populist challenge more effectively.
As political theorist Jan-Werner Müller has
suggested in his study What Is Populism?, populist
political actors and movements are both anti-elitist
and anti-pluralist, and the latter is the stance
endangering democracy.16 If movements or polit-
ical leaders claim that only their positions are legit-
imate and that only they truly represent “the people”
(a fictional entity, of course), one enters dangerous
territory. By contrast, movements and forms of polit-
ical protest that are anti-elitist but not anti-pluralist
need to be recognized as legitimate. Developments
in both Europe and North America during the last
decade should have made it abundantly clear that
political elites have failed to recognize a profound
disaffection of significant parts of their societies by
the status quo. Chancellor Merkel’s use of the by
now almost proverbial “alternativeless” (alterna-
tivlos), a term employed by some of her Cabinet
members as well, to justify specific policy decisions,
arguably best captures this failure. Not coinciden-
tally, the government-sponsored Association for the
10
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German Language selected alternativlos as the
2010 “Non-Word of the Year.”17
Equally important for a better understanding of the
populist challenge is historian Federico
Finchelstein’s recent study on post-World War II
populist movements and regimes. Finchelstein
suggests understanding populism as conceptually
neither left nor right and as “an intolerant under-
standing of democracy, in which dissent is allowed
but portrayed as lacking any legitimacy.”18
Finchelstein further argues that the tendency to
paint populism as an “unproblematized negative
take on democracy reveals a simplistic, and often
self-serving, identification of democracy with neolib-
eralism.”19 Finally his analysis clearly differentiates
between fascist and populist movements, a distinc-
tion that is occasionally lost in the heated American
political discourse. 
These critiques are not merely of an academic
nature, but they can have profound consequences
for potential responses to populist movements and
parties. Just like pro-European politicians across
the continent still do not seem to truly understand
the disaffection of a growing number of citizens with
the European Union, so transatlanticist elites would
be well served to take the concerns of citizens (a
higher percentage in Europe and Germany than in
the United States) about transatlantic projects more
seriously. TTIP, for example, has been criticized by
a number of unions, NGOs, and environmental
groups for insufficient attention to labor standards
and consumer and environmental protection. The
secretive nature of the TTIP negotiations did not
exactly help to dispel these doubts.
A technocratic attitude of many transatlanticists has
also fed into the prejudices of anti-elitist citizens on
both sides of the Atlantic. As historian Adam Tooze
observed recently about the past two decades, “on
both sides of the Atlantic, it [has been] the job of
centrist intellectuals to swat down critical talk from
the left about the rule of undemocratic technocrats
and the hollowing out of democracy.”20 Much of
the recent literature on populism and illiberal
democracies shares Tooze’s verdict.
German-American Cooperation: To What
End?
Finally, German and American transatlanticists
need to articulate more clearly what they believe to
be the goals of German-American cooperation. In
light of the current deep political rift between the
Federal Republic and the United States, it is under-
standable that both countries have focused on the
benefits of their economic ties. For example, a
news service produced on behalf of the German
Foreign Office emphasized the role of the automo-
tive industry, with Mercedes-Benz plants in
Alabama, Volkswagen in Tennessee, and BMW in
South Carolina.21 In addition, the German appren-
ticeship model has been gaining traction in the
United States as of late.22
Yet this is not enough. A crucial part of the argu-
ment to be made by transatlanticists is what values
one considers to be at the heart of transatlantic
relations. Of course, this cannot and should not
take the form of a specific political program. But
the basic values connecting the two countries need
to be discussed and made more explicit than they
have in the past. Perhaps the current crisis might
offer a chance for transatlantic actors of different
political convictions to work together, as it seems
crucial for transatlanticists from the Left to the non-
Trumpian Right to appreciate their common
ground, despite their policy differences.
A Reason for (Cautious) Optimism?
Yet perhaps there is, despite the current chal-
lenges, a reason for (cautious) optimism. German-
American relations have endured crises before,
and the fear on both sides of the Atlantic of perma-
nent damages has previously turned out to be
unwarranted. During the 1960s, for example, when
many younger Germans became vocal opponents
of the Vietnam War, an “other transatlantic alliance”
formed, which challenged many of the Cold War
pieties in West Germany and the United States.23
Despite the many problematic features of espe-
cially the West German student movement, its
wholesale designation as “anti-American” has
always missed the point, because it not only shared
values with its American counterpart but also drew
11
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a significant degree of inspiration from the events
at Berkeley, Columbia, and elsewhere. As the histo-
rian Martin Klimke has shown, this “other alliance”
ultimately resulted in the emergence of “a much
more nuanced and diverse transnational picture of
the United States, which ha[d] begun to incorporate
ethnic minorities and other marginalized voices into
its canon. Although by no means free from gross
distortions and misrepresentations, it is nonethe-
less a more mature and balanced perspective on
the United States as a country, including its many
advantages as well as shortcomings.”24
Another example of an ultimately beneficial
outcome of an ostensible crisis of transatlantic rela-
tions is the emerging Holocaust awareness in the
United States, which began in the late 1970s, with
the inclusion of the Holocaust in more and more
high school world history curricula and the airing of
the NBC miniseries Holocaust in 1978. Throughout
the 1980s, a veritable “Holocaust Angst” plagued
West German politicians and diplomats, who
obsessed that these developments as well as the
creation of the United States Holocaust Memorial
Museum in Washington, DC, would result in
increased anti-German sentiment in the United
States and ultimately damage the close German-
American political partnership.25 Ultimately,
however, none of this occurred. Just as there was
no wave of anti-German sentiment in the United
States, West German officials later realized that a
non-apologetic approach to the Nazi past and the
commemoration of the Holocaust had the potential
to strengthen transatlantic relations and Germany’s
international reputation in general.
What both episodes suggest is that even develop-
ments that worried transatlanticists in both West
Germany and the United States at the time do not
have to permanently damage transatlantic rela-
tions. They might therefore serve as a reminder not
to despair in light of recent poll numbers, which
suggest a record-level mistrust felt by Germans
toward the United States.26 That distrust, however,
necessitates strengthening ties between civil
society actors on both sides of the Atlantic, as
several Transatlantic Dialogue participants have
suggested. These ties would also remind the
German public that the current U.S. administration
is not representative of American society.
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MIND THE TECHNOLOGY GAP:
THE IMPORTANCE OF TECHNOLOGICAL
LITERACY AMID TRANSATLANTIC STRIFE 
THOMAS HANLEY
The transatlantic alliance is showing unprece-
dented signs of cracking. Since President Donald
Trump’s election in 2016, it has been nearly impos-
sible to find major policy priorities where Europe
and the United States agree. Mr. Trump even ques-
tions why the United States is so closely aligned
with Europe in the first place, and has named the
European Union (EU) one of the United States’
greatest “foes.”1 His disdain for the European
Union is no secret, but his most consistent object
of derision has been Germany. In response,
German chancellor Angela Merkel has said that
Europe can no longer “rely on the superpower of
the United States,”2 while German foreign minister
Heiko Maas has pointed out that even the very
foundation of the transatlantic alliance—a
consensus on shared values—“has come off the
rails.”3 Despite this cleavage, Germany and the
United States continue to face similar threats. In
looking to the next generation, one of the greatest
challenges will be ensuring both American and
European societies are aptly prepared for a world
dominated by new technologies. Technology is at
the heart of many challenges in the twenty-first
century: confronting China, defending democracy
from foreign influence, or even ensuring a basic
civic trust within society. Technologies such as arti-
ficial intelligence (AI), deepfake videos, data
mining, and 5G are only going to become more
important in the future. Frighteningly enough, most
legislators are not prepared to embrace this reality.
In the United States, Senator Orrin Hatch became
perhaps the most meme-worthy example of a
pervasive technological illiteracy among policy-
makers when he asked Mark Zuckerberg, “How do
you sustain a business model in which users don’t
pay for your service?”4 In Germany, the recent
debate over whether Chinese technology should
be excluded from the country’s 5G network has
shown policymakers’ inability to grasp the complex-
ities of the technology in question. On both topics,
German and American government officials
desperately require technological assistance. 
Yet this is only half the story. While policymakers in
the West may be struggling to understand
emerging technologies, countries like Russia and
China are not. And they are increasingly exploiting
these technologies to their advantage.
Technological illiteracy is an internal vulnerability
that has exacerbated external threats to Western
democracies. This merits action. And while
substantial transatlantic policy cooperation is
unlikely considering the current state of the rela-
tionship, there is still plenty of room for lower-stake
cooperation. Transatlantic enthusiasts would be
wise to channel their efforts here. One such lower-
stake solution would be to empower and deepen
cooperation between government institutions
devoted to promoting technological expertise
among legislators, specifically offices of technology
assessment. Cooperation on this front has an
actual chance for success, and would ensure poli-
cymakers are appropriately informed to weigh the
tough political dilemmas of tomorrow. 
Emerging Tech Threats
The role that technology plays and will continue to
play in society necessitates that politicians
adequately understand it. However, an even more
pressing motivation is the fact that countries like
Russia and China are well positioned to exploit this
knowledge gap. In both countries, power is concen-
trated in a much smaller number of governing
elites—and these elites are technologically astute.
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Both countries have proven that they are quite
capable of understanding technology’s potential—
and using it to their advantage.
In Russia, Vladimir Putin dominates the political
landscape, directing both foreign and domestic
policy. One of the ways he has been able to influ-
ence Western domestic politics is through disinfor-
mation campaigns. Putin was quick to recognize
the dark potential of Western social media plat-
forms. Disinformation operations were taking place
within Russia as early as 2011, following anti-Putin
protests.5 Since then, the effort has been exported
and has targeted every NATO member state.6 In
the United States, the 2016 presidential election
was the apex of a targeted campaign by the
Russian government to manipulate U.S. voters
through Facebook, Instagram, Twitter, and
Youtube. Its ultimate design was to polarize the
American electorate by “spread[ing] sensationalist,
conspiratorial, and other forms of junk political
news and misinformation to voters across the polit-
ical spectrum.”7 This is, of course, nothing new for
Europe, particularly Germany. As early as 2014,
Moscow was using social media networks and
comment sections to peddle pro-Russian
messaging throughout the German populace.8 And
in the lead up to the May elections for the European
Parliament, Russian efforts on German social
media have focused on bolstering support for EU-
skeptic parties such as the Alternative for Germany
(AfD),9 while at the same time amplifying
messages from left-wing anti-fascists to exacerbate
internal tensions.10 Yet these tactics have not been
nearly as successful in Germany as they have been
in the United States—partly because of the U.S.’
inability to recognize what was happening. U.S.
intelligence officials were aware that Russia had
successfully used social media as a propaganda
tool both domestically and in Ukraine, yet it took
them at least two years to realize that similar efforts
were being deployed in the United States.11
While Russia has shown a keen ability to exploit
Western social media platforms, the more formi-
dable threat comes from China. Recent concerns
about the implications of including Chinese tech-
nology into Western supply chains is a case in
point. Particular focus has been given to Western
critical infrastructure technology, such as the tech-
nology used in 5G networks. The West’s growing
dependence on Chinese technology is a direct
result of the Chinese government’s “Made in China
2025” initiative, a concerted effort by the Chinese
government to become a global high-tech leader.
In combining technological innovation with subsi-
dized pricing, Chinese technology has become a
very attractive alternative to its Western competi-
tors in the American and European market. The
suspected predatory nature of such technology has
to do with its security implications. In Africa,
Chinese technology was used to build the computer
network for the African Union. The network included
a backdoor that allowed China to download and
transfer confidential data back to Beijing for nearly
five years.12 Additionally, many in the West point
to a 2017 Chinese intelligence law which stipulates
that “all organizations and citizens shall, in accor-
dance with the law, support, cooperate with, and
collaborate in national intelligence work, and guard
the secrecy of national intelligence work they are
aware of.”13 Law or no law, every Chinese
company and citizen is at the behest of the Chinese
Communist Party (CCP) leadership. But the law
conveniently provides written proof that Chinese
technology could be used as a tool for the CCP to
gain critical access to Western infrastructure, data,
and information. And as China marches on toward
2025, its close relationship with its tech companies
will ensure its leaders retain a technological
literacy—because their relationship requires it. In
the Chinese political system, Chinese technology
companies are essentially arms of the government.
These companies “are increasingly co-opted into
national policy,” and “have even been assigned
roles in government strategy documents,”14 which
necessitates a deeper knowledge.
Both Russia and China have a dangerous acumen
for utilizing technology as a geopolitical tool, and
this constitutes a real challenge for transatlantic
policymakers. Ultimately, open societies like
Germany and the United States will always be
more susceptible to external threats than countries
like Russia and China. But openness and freedom
have always been worth fighting for, making it crit-
ical that we are prepared to continually do so.
Ensuring policymakers in the United States and
16
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Germany possess a deep technological literacy is
paramount to inspiring the informed political debate
necessary to combat this challenge. 
Combatting Disinformation on Social
Media
Western attempts to properly comprehend and
subsequently regulate content on social media plat-
forms have fallen flat. This is most glaring in the
United States. The U.S. regulatory environment
provided ideal conditions for the Russian campaign
to succeed. The United States’ 1996 amendment
to the U.S. Communications Decency Act chose
not to hold social media platforms responsible for
content published by third parties (with exceptions
for illegal content such as violence, child pornog-
raphy, or copyright infringement). Third parties—
such as public authorities—are the ones required
to notify the social media platform of its content’s
illegality.15 While the U.S. government could have
hardly foreseen the vulnerability social media would
constitute to open societies, its susceptibility to
Russian disinformation is now clear and present.
Yet little has been done to update the lax regulatory
environment. Instead, the policy prescriptions to
address Russian disinformation have presented
real questions over whether policymakers under-
stand the evolving nature of the disinformation
threat.
The focus of the U.S. response has been on efforts
to increase transparency over who buys political
advertisements on social media platforms. The
Russian Internet Research Agency (IRA), the
Kremlin-backed troll factory weaponized in Russian
disinformation campaigns,16 was well known to
have used ads on both Facebook and Google to
advance its goals.17 U.S. legislators believe that
increasing transparency about those advertise-
ments will help counter interference efforts. This
legislation is entitled “The Honest Ads Act,” a bipar-
tisan bill which would require all digital platforms
with 50 million or more monthly users to keep a
public file containing the details of all election-
related communication purchased by a group or
entity that spends over $500 on the platform.
Senator Amy Klobuchar, one of the bill’s sponsors,
released a statement arguing that the legislation is
meant to “protect our democracy and prevent this
kind of [foreign] interference from ever happening
again.”18 Increased transparency is always a
worthy endeavor, and the legislation will prove
useful in pulling political advertising out of the dark.
Yet its characterization as being a solution to curb
foreign interference is indicative of an inability to
understand how Russian actors’ use of the tech-
nology is changing. The ads purchased during the
run-up to the 2016 election were primarily bought
from Russian IP addresses and paid for in Russian
rubles.19 The Honest Ads Act is meant to expose
that behavior, and thus make it more difficult for
disinformation campaigns to fool unsuspecting
viewers. 
Unfortunately Russian tactics are, again, ahead of
U.S. policy prescriptions. Facebook has already
indicated that since the 2016 election, the Russian
IRA-linked accounts “have used VPNs to hide their
locations and paid third parties to purchase ads on
their behalf.”20 If Facebook cannot track those
efforts, a public file is useless for countering
Russian interference. Additionally, an extensive
report from the University of Oxford on the IRA’s
use of social media in the United States demon-
strated that “the most far reaching IRA activity is in
organic posting, not advertisements,” and showed
that those efforts “increased substantially after the
[2016] election.”21 Therefore, the U.S.’ current
legislative approach is not focusing on the crux of
the problem. As Claire Wardle, executive director
of First Draft, a nonprofit organization based at the
Harvard Kennedy School that combats disinforma-
tion, has noted, “at a policy level, the conversation
that people are having is based on what happened
in 2016. The challenge is that politicians have
almost no knowledge of how these platforms actu-
ally work.”22 It is a case of the regulatory dialectic,
a term coined by Professor Edward Kane in the
1980s describing the way in which “financial insti-
tutions found innovative ways to circumvent regu-
lations designed to restrict their behavior.”23 We
are seeing this dialectic in action when it comes to
attempts to regulate disinformation online: nefar-
ious Russian actors are showing the same innova-
tive spirit in their navigation of Western social media
platforms. Without a better understanding of the
platforms themselves, U.S. policymakers are
17
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doomed to always be one step behind.
5G
In Germany, no issue has divided Berlin and
Washington more than the question of whether
including Chinese technology into Western 5G
networks constitutes a security risk. 5G will revolu-
tionize everything from manufacturing to kitchen
toasters, and enable other more complicated
procedures that require instantaneous data trans-
missions—like self-driving cars and remote surgery
operations. Some have gone so far as to liken the
potential effect of 5G to that of electricity in enabling
unseen levels of industrial productivity.24 Securing
the network is therefore critical. Yet, if Germany’s
risk assessment and subsequent debate has been
indicative of anything, it is that government repre-
sentatives do not adequately understand the tech-
nology they are attempting to secure.
Huawei, the main Chinese technology provider, has
a distinct advantage in that Chinese technology is
already deeply embedded in the main German
telecommunication providers’ 4G network infra-
structure.25 This means that upgrading to a 5G
network with European or South Korean tech-
nology would first require removing the existing
Chinese infrastructure from the 4G network in order
to install the new infrastructure. This is widely
believed to be a very expensive and time-intensive
process. Which, combined with Huawei’s subsi-
dized pricing, provides clear financial incentive to
continue using Chinese technology in Germany’s
5G network. This point is central to the German
government’s rationale in allowing providers that
rely on Huawei infrastructure to be included in the
5G auction.26 Yet this point is devoid of any
substantive technological understanding, because
hard facts on the subject do not exist. To date, there
has been no public government reporting outlining
the costs and deployment delay of switching out
Huawei technology. It may well prove to be more
expensive and time-intensive, but it is thus far
unclear and such an important decision cannot be
made on mere speculation. In fact, globally this
argument is almost exclusively substantiated with
rather generic figures and vague time estimates
compiled by the telecommunication firms them-
selves—which have every incentive to keep costs
low by using their existing Huawei infrastructure in
building Germany’s 5G network.27
Yet the ultimate decision not to exclude Huawei is
predicated on the belief that any security risks can
be properly detected. This too presents a problem.
Following the British White Lab model, the German
Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) estab-
lished a Huawei testing center in Bonn where
Huawei works in conjunction with government offi-
cials from BSI to frequently test their technology
for security vulnerabilities. BSI assesses the equip-
ment used by conducting source-code reviews,
which entails examining the programming language
used to run network gear and screening for
possible “backdoors” that would allow Chinese
intelligence officials to gain covert access.28 The
German government has essentially agreed that
this testing guarantees the necessary security to
allow Huawei technology to be included in the
German network. Yet this decision shows little
understanding for the actual technology powering
5G. 5G will be much more dependent on software,
compared to 4G, which was more reliant on tradi-
tional hardware. It expects to be the first “software-
driven network architecture,” as while
software-defined networking, or SDN, has been
around for years, “its real impact in terms of flexi-
bility and range of services available won’t be felt
until 5G is more widely deployed.”29 Because of
this, the functionality of the system is dependent
upon its latest software update. 
Therefore, the focus of any testing has to be on
software as opposed to hardware. And that testing
must continually remain ahead of software
updates—which, considering the frequency of
potential updates, would be very difficult to main-
tain. In the United Kingdom, testing centers have
already proven to be inadequately prepared. The
National Cyber Security Agency’s latest report on
the country’s Huawei testing center has already
noted that “software in Huawei equipment tested
in [their testing center] doesn’t always match soft-
ware found in products on the market.”30 It would
thus be nearly impossible to ensure that every soft-
ware update is adequately vetted before deploy-
ment. Even if inspections did occur, they would take
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significant amounts of time and, most often, involve
investigating benign updates merely meant to fix
bugs. Therefore, the most likely solution would
mean “patch inspection and testing would have to
be done after deployment,”31 which in layman’s
terms means that the authorities would be
searching for an intruder after they’d already been
through the house. 
Offices of Technology Assessment
In both U.S. efforts to rein in Russian disinformation
on social media platforms as well as Germany’s
grappling over whether to include Chinese tech-
nology in its 5G network, questionable political
decisions highlight a dangerous technological illit-
eracy. Both Germany and the United States
desperately need experts present and available to
provide apolitical, timely, fact-based reporting and
advice for lawmakers. Traditionally, Offices of
Technology Assessment in Europe and the United
States have provided such expertise. In the United
States, the office was originally set up as a
congressional agency in 1972 before it was
defunded in 1995 by then-Speaker of the House
Newt Gingrich.32 In Germany, the office has existed
since 1990, but has been rather ineffective at
providing the necessary expertise during critical
technological debates. In reinstituting the U.S.
Office of Technology Assessment, revitalizing
Germany’s Office of Technology Assessment, and
deepening transatlantic cooperation between the
two, transatlantic leaders would possess the neces-
sary expertise to produce cutting-edge policy
prescriptions for countering external technological
threats, and subsequently be better able to defend
their democracies.
In the United States, these efforts should begin with
bringing back the Office of Technology Assessment.
The purpose of the office was to produce neutral,
objective scientific assessments for congressional
committees when requested. These were written
in close consultation with leaders from industry,
policy, and academia “to help Members of
Congress understand and plan for the short- and
long-term consequences of the applications of
technology.”33 Yet perhaps its most useful function
was that its staffers were frequently on Capitol Hill
engaging with lawmakers. The office went beyond
mere assessment reports, guarding against tech-
nological illiteracy by frequently giving informal
advice, testifying before Congress, and frequently
commenting on legislation. This was critical, as “the
oral communication that occurred between staffers
and members of Congress was crucial for promul-
gating the contents of OTA’s reports.”34 One such
example of its influence was a 1984 report that
questioned the reliability of polygraph tests. The
report led Congress to enact limits on their use by
employers.35 Today, any U.S. government
research regarding technology is currently housed
within the Government Accountability Office (GAO),
specifically in its Science, Technology Assessment,
and Analytics (STAA) team. Yet STAA is part of a
much larger mandate, housed within GAO, which
gets about 800 requests from Congress a year (on
a large range of topics) and gives priority to reviews
mandated by law, conference reports, and then
requests from congressional committee leader-
ship.36 This makes it very difficult to ensure that
the pressing technological issues are getting the
attention they deserve. For this reason, those
suggesting reviving the OTA, like Rep. Mark
Takano, have argued that the OTA would “be
[better] responsive to immediate questions and the
needs of members and staff,”37 something that is
desperately needed and unavailable within the
current structure. Yet more importantly, restoring
the OTA as its own congressional agency and
untangling technological research from the web of
GAO bureaucracy would be an important step
toward recognizing the importance emerging tech-
nologies and technological literacy holds in an
American future. 
In Europe, it was not long before countries began
taking notice of the United States’ Office of
Technology Assessment and copying the model to
ensure their legislators were equally informed on
pertinent technological developments. In Germany,
the Office of Technology Assessment (TAB) at the
German Bundestag was created in 1990 to inde-
pendently advise lawmakers. TAB is operated by
the Institute for Technology Assessment and
Systems Analysis (ITAS) in the Karlsruhe Institute
of Technology (KIT).38 The office is composed
mostly of academics and researchers,39 and
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produces reports in accordance with an agenda set
by the German Bundestag’s committee for
Education, Research, and Technology
Assessment. The office has published over 160
reports since its founding, and most recently has
completed studies on autonomous vehicles and
energy storage systems.40 Yet it has not always
been as effective as it should. Its work on 5G is a
perfect example. While the German debate has
been starved of technological expertise, TAB’s
report on 5G is expected “at the earliest in 2020,”
that is, after the 5G auction has been completed,
the technology providers have been selected, and
the technology is already in use.41 For this reason,
Germany’s Office of Technology Assessment is well
in need of an update. 
Fostering Transatlantic Technological
Literacy 
In reinstating the U.S. OTA and updating
Germany’s TAB, these offices should prioritize
three points in order to maximize their value. The
first is to ensure they are maintaining a presence
within the policymaking community. One thing that
made the initial American venture so successful
was its capacity to provide informal advice by being
consistently present on Capitol Hill and engaging
with lawmakers. Both offices should be much more
than their reports. Cultivating relationships with
legislators and their staffers is a necessity. One
way to do this would be by giving the offices more
say in the research agenda. While Congress and
the Bundestag should continue directing the
agenda of their respective technology assessment
offices, the offices themselves should have an input
in that agenda. If it can assumed that legislators do
not adequately understand emerging technologies,
they are unlikely to have a sense of which tech-
nologies merit closer consideration. This input
should in no way supersede the direction of the
legislators, but rather help ensure that the agenda
stays ahead of impending technological dilemmas.
It would help safeguard any potential for repeating
the German 5G experience, where the debate is
completed before the assessment from TAB
arrives. It could also guarantee the offices are
focusing on the necessary research questions. For
Germany’s 5G network, this would include an
extensive analysis of the costs and delay associ-
ated with removing Huawei hardware. It would also
provide a more extensive overview of the tech-
nology’s most important elements, to ensure
government security testing is adequately suited to
5G technology. Bringing office staffers into the
agenda-making process would help build more
substantive relationships with policymakers to
ensure the effectiveness of these offices’ advisory
role and better position legislators to gauge tech-
nological developments.
Second, and perhaps most importantly, these
offices should cultivate private partnerships. In the
field of emerging technologies, when it comes to
5G and social media platforms, the experts are
most often in the private sector. The West is not
doing enough to cultivate these relationships.
Google’s decision to refuse to work with the
Pentagon on artificial intelligence while concur-
rently building a Chinese search engine is indica-
tive of this reality.42 Foremost, there should be a
concerted effort on both sides of the Atlantic to bring
more actors with industry experience into these
offices as staffers. The offices cannot be staffed
exclusively with academics. Additionally, the offices
should provide a much-needed bridge between
government and the private sector. While the rela-
tionship between the two is increasingly rather sour,
there is nevertheless an opportunity for increased
collaboration. For instance, Mark Zuckerberg has
asked regulators and governments to work closely
with Facebook to ensure they have a more active
role over controlling Internet content.43 Yet, tech
companies’ chief complaint in prior attempts to do
so has been that government officials do not fully
understand the technology their companies
operate. Relying on technology assessment offices
to act as an intermediary would help alleviate that
concern. Industry professionals would be talking to
experts that understand their technology. And
having cultivated relationships with the legislators,
the offices could provide a trusted neutral platform
for encouraging collaboration and understanding
between private industry actors and government
officials.
Last, despite transatlantic leaders’ seeming inability
to work with one another, encouraging collaboration
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between a newly reinstated American OTA, the
German TAB, and other European technology
assessment bodies would require little political
capital and pay dividends. The current collaborating
body is the European Parliamentary Technology
Assessment Partners, which has twelve members
(including Germany’s TAB), and ten associate
members (including the U.S.’ STAA).44 While there
is an annual meeting, project collaboration is limited
to a database collecting each country’s published
reports. This collaboration should increase. There
should be a more robust exchange of best prac-
tices, particularly in how to effectively engage with
policymakers in an advisory role. Additionally, more
effective collaboration would involve conducting
cooperative transatlantic projects addressing tech-
nologies that challenge Western democracies. One
such idea would be a transatlantic report on
Russian disinformation campaigns, focusing first
on the technology driving social media platforms
and how the Russian technological toolbox has
developed in reaction to legislative proposals on
both sides of the Atlantic. Considering the national
security element to such a project, expanding the
partnership to include NATO’s Science and
Technology Organization would provide the neces-
sary security perspective. This would enhance
assessment reports by ensuring research and
expertise appreciates the security dimensions that
new technologies continually present, and focusing
in on transatlantic collaboration would foster coop-
erative responses to common threats.
Conclusion
Ultimately, addressing the problems of the next
generation will continue to be dependent upon
understanding emerging technologies. And the
future does not look brighter than the recent past.
Ongoing efforts to comprehend artificial intelligence
have not proven any more inspiring. In the U.S.,
continuing efforts to regulate biases in AI algorithms
have been hampered by how few legislators
possess “a deep enough technical grasp of data
and machine learning to approach regulation in an
appropriately nuanced manner.”45 And in Germany,
experts have criticized the country’s AI strategy,
noting its “considerable need for further develop-
ment,”46 while the government ministries have
failed to explain what the strategy’s allocated funds
will be used for.47 These technological issues are
not going away. It is thus imperative that lawmakers
are technologically literate for the future. Russian
and Chinese leadership already is, and transat-
lantic leaders cannot fall further behind. U.S. and
European democracies need government institu-
tions prepared to support this process. Reinstituting
the Office of Technology Assessment (OTA) in the
United States and revitalizing its German equiva-
lent (TAB) will go a long way to guaranteeing
American and German lawmakers are provided
with the timely, informed analysis they require to
face these challenges. And in deepening a transat-
lantic relationship between U.S. and European
offices, policymakers will be better positioned to
engage one another with a similar understanding
of the technological intricacies fundamental to
many analogous challenges. 
But technological advice can only go so far. The
focus of such an effort is ultimately to ensure
informed debate. These dilemmas most often come
down to addressing fundamental political ques-
tions. The decisions over how best to regulate
content on social media platforms is closely tied to
free speech. Equally, navigating the fine line
between ensuring fair business competition and
adequately mitigating security risks is something
the government is meant to decide. No technolog-
ical report or advice will supplant that reality. But
legislators on both sides of the Atlantic will be ill-
prepared to make the right decisions without an
extensive understanding of the technology behind
the issues they are meant to address. In a time of
transatlantic strife, this is something both Europe
and the United States can work together to guard
against. And as technology increasingly reflects
societal values,48 perhaps a deeper understanding
of technology will help remind transatlantic
lawmakers that their values are not as far apart as
the current rhetoric suggests.
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The transatlantic relationship is facing a period of
growing scrutiny and skepticism in both the United
States (U.S.) and Europe. As The Economist aptly
observed in early 2019, “the Atlantic Ocean is
starting to look awfully wide,”1 and that distance
can be seen in areas ranging from disagreements
surrounding economic and security policy to
debates over the breadth and depth of “shared
values.”  This perceived growing divide begs the
following question: what is the value of transatlanti-
cism today for both the U.S. and Europe? 
The transatlantic relationship is, at its core,
strategic: a geopolitical arrangement that sought to
assist in ensuring the current and future prosperity
and security of member states on both sides of the
Atlantic. While it has evolved over the years to
adjust to changes in the global environment in
which it rests, this core geopolitical undercurrent
remains. Transatlanticism emerged as a solution
for particular challenges the U.S. and Europe
faced. 
Therefore, I argue that the ongoing significance of
the transatlantic relationship stems not only from
the core pillars found in transatlanticism of old, but
from the ability of this relationship to continue to
address emerging and future challenges. One
central set of challenges are those posed by digi-
talization: i.e., the widespread adoption of digital
and/or networked technologies and processes
alongside the corresponding social, economic, and
security transformations that have occurred, are
now occurring, and will occur as a result.2
If the continued importance of the transatlantic rela-
tionship for both the U.S. and Europe hinges on its
ability to address emerging challenges, the broader
question then becomes “what were the challenges
it sought to address and what are the upcoming
challenges it now faces.” To that end, this paper
will proceed in two parts. The first section, “Looking
Back,” provides a brief overview of the origin and
evolution of the challenges that gave birth to the
transatlantic relationship after the Second World
War. It serves to emphasize the strategic nature of
the relationship and the specific motivations behind
the policies and institutions that were deployed.
The second and far larger section, “Looking
Ahead,” begins with a discussion of the new land-
scape that this relationship finds itself imbedded
within, including a discussion of why digitalization
represents an important test case and opportunity
for transatlantic cooperation moving forward. This
section will also offer a series of recommendations
for maintaining geoeconomic cooperation in
general and cooperation on issues related to digi-
talization in particular. 
Looking Back
While the primary purpose of this paper is not to
provide a detailed history of transatlantic relations,
this section provides a brief overview of the moti-
vations behind its inception and the corresponding
institutions set up to achieve those motivations after
the Second World War. This section serves two
purposes: (1) to provide an historical foundation to
be referenced in later sections and (2) to reinforce
the jointly geoeconomic and geostrategic nature of
the transatlantic relationship. This overview is by
no means exhaustive, nor is it meant to be partic-
ularly detailed. 
In the aftermath of World War II, the U.S. and
Europe were faced with a decimated global
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economy and international order. In cooperation,
they sought to rebuild economic prosperity for a
series of like-minded countries, set the rules of the
road on geoeconomic issues ranging from finance
to trade, and address the security threat posed by
the USSR. In its very inception, the transatlantic
relationship orientated itself around the intersection
of geoeconomic and geostrategic concerns.
Efforts to rebuild the Western European economies
centered on the implementation of the Marshall
Plan. The over $12 billion in funding served three
interrelated purposes: (1) spurring a resurgence of
industrialization and increasing investment in
Europe, (2) establishing Europe as a vibrant market
for American goods, and (3) reducing the suscep-
tibility of Western European countries to a
Communist threat, internally or externally.3
U.S. and European efforts to set “rules of the road”
in this post-WWII era centered on the three Bretton
Woods institutions. The World Bank served as the
foundation for policies on finance, the International
Monetary Fund (IMF) served as the foundation for
global monetary cooperation, and the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) (later
replaced by the World Trade Organization (WTO))
was the backbone of a U.S.-led multilateral trading
system. 
In terms of security policy, the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO) served as the core conduit
for American and European collaboration and coor-
dination to address the security threat posed by
the USSR. NATO serves as both a political alliance
that allows member states to consult on security
concerns (Article 4) and a military alliance that
centers around mutual and collective defense
(Article 5).4
Notably, the international environment in which
these institutions were embedded did not remain
stagnant. For example, the GATT experienced
rising deadlock with the rise of the BRICs (Brazil,
Russia, India, and China) whose “economic struc-
tures and ideology, where the state is a central
economic actor, were and are not consistent with
the Washington Consensus vision of a limited role
for the state in a primarily market driven economy.”5
In response, the U.S. and Europe undertook a
strategic change in venue from the GATT to the
WTO in 1994-1995. By undertaking an institutional
venue shift from which other states could not afford
to be excluded, the U.S. and Europe were able to
undo deadlock in the GATT and continue to pursue
their own rules for trade through the new WTO.6
Here, the historic transatlantic duopoly found in
U.S. and European trade policy successfully
continued to set the rules for the global order. The
deadlock returned, however, with the failure of the
Doha Round and will likely persist given the road-
blocks encountered by both the Trans-Pacific
Partnership (TPP) and the Transatlantic Trade and
Investment Partnership (TTIP).7
The security aspects of the alliance similarly under-
went a transformation after the fall of the USSR.
While questions over the future utility of the alliance
were abundant in the immediate post-Cold War
period, its organization and mission underwent a
series of transitions away from viewing threats as
primarily inter-state and kinetic toward the inclusion
of intra-state conflict, cross-national terrorism, and
cyber conflict.8 Given its longevity, it remains one
of the “strongest, most successful  alliance[s]  in
history.”9
In conclusion, the core motivations for and institu-
tions of the transatlantic relationship have histori-
cally centered around joint U.S. and European
economic and security interests with varying
success. As these interests evolved, so did the
motivations of and policies animating the relation-
ship.  While analytically we often separate
geostrategic and geoeconomic goals and strate-
gies, in practice they frequently overlap and/or are
mutually reinforcing. For the U.S. and Europe
during this period, economic policies served, in
part, security ends and security policies enabled,
in part, the success of economic policies.  
Looking Ahead 
Given the challenges that lead to transatlanticism
as a cornerstone of U.S. and European foreign
policy, what are the challenges that animate their
current geopolitical environment? What opportuni-
ties for cooperation exist for the U.S. and Europe
26
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to continue to jointly address emerging and future
challenges? This section of the paper examines
the current landscape any form of transatlantic rela-
tions will find itself embedded within before identi-
fying three opportunities for future cooperation in
relation to digitalization.
THE CURRENT LANDSCAPE 
While the current landscape is comprised of a
myriad of factors, three are of particular note for
the purposes of this paper: (1) fraying relations, (2)
a rising China, and (3) increasing digitalization.
Fraying Transatlantic Relations
One merely has to have opened a newspaper or
an internet browser over the last four to five years
to observe a widening gap emerging between the
U.S. and Europe. Sound familiar?
! “Today, our historically close relationship with 
     Europe is under strain. Transatlantic partners 
     are concerned that Washington no longer 
     values the relationship and has lost sight of the
     importance of continuing close collaboration.”10
! “[C]onfidence is declining faster than capability
     in the transatlantic relationship. The Trump 
     Presidency has left allies uncertain and 
     concerned while within Europe the rise of the 
     populist right and left has confirmed the need
     for wide ranging economic, political, and social
     reforms.”11
! “[T]he shroud of secrecy around [TTIP] has not
     only strained transatlantic relations and 
     provoked a massive popular backlash; it has 
     also been embarrassingly ineffective at 
     keeping the agreement under wraps.”12
! “Europe and America must work to stop their 
     relationship unravelling.”13
! “Europe’s fragile peace deal with the U.S. on 
     trade is at a breaking point.”14
! “Beijing’s financial and military inroads into 
     Europe are calling into question America’s   
     traditional assumptions about Transatlantic 
     cooperation.”15
! “[S]everal EU states joined China’s new Asian 
     Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB). They did
     so despite significant US disapproval.”16
! “Germany, which had already announced that 
     it will fall significantly short of NATO’s defense 
     spending goals, annoying the United States, 
     risks provoking Washington further by failing to
     reach even its own slimmed-down target.”17
While much of the coverage focuses on signs of a
weakening transatlantic relationship, core historical
components of transatlanticism persist. Also
persisting are the deep economic ties between the
U.S. and Europe. According to the U.S. Chamber
of Commerce, in 2019 “the economic relationship
between the U.S. and Europe remains by far the
largest on earth. [...] Over $3.75 billion in goods
and services is traded across the Atlantic every
single day. No place in the world has attracted more
U.S. foreign direct investment (FDI) than Europe,
and Europe remains by far the largest source of
investment into the United States.”18 While it is
easy to identify emerging fault-lines, it is equally
important to recognize that core, shared interests
and cooperation remain. 
Transatlantic Relations and a Rising China 
Concern over a widening gap between the U.S.
and Europe has been accompanied by concerns
over the political and economic rise of China, a
country increasingly “playing the role of the junior
superpower.”19 Notably, the significance of a rising
China for the existing world order and its institutions
is rarely, if ever, contested. Though, the specific,
potential consequences of their rise remain hotly
debated. 
Recently, China’s strong economic performance in
the 2008-2009 Great Recession has shone an
even brighter spotlight on this issue.20
Economically, China has expanded its percentage
of global GDP faster than any other rising state
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from 1870 to present21 and in 2013, China’s GDP
represented 14.9 percent of the world economy.22
According to the World Bank, China is now the
world’s second largest economy, has “the fastest
sustained expansion by a major economy in
history,” and since 2008, has been the largest
single contributor to world growth.23
In addition to its economic might, China’s navy and
air force are rapidly expanding their reach,
providing increased force projection capabilities
regionally and globally.24 In both the 1990s and
2000s, China tripled its military outlays. This is a
trend we are not likely to see reversed. In fact, the
Pentagon noted in its 2013 white paper to the U.S.
Congress that China has the “fiscal strength and
political will” to sustain this effort.25 Using both
economic and military measures, China is uncon-
testably rising.  
Notably, digitalization represents a core component
of, as well as an important outcome from, China’s
rise. The McKinsey Global Institute reported in
2017 that, “China’s digital transformation is already
having a profound impact on its own economy, and
is likely to have an increasing influence on the
worldwide digital landscape.”26 This impact is
already being felt as emerging debates around the
implementation of artificial intelligence (AI)27 and
5G28 center around China. 
Transatlantic Relations in an Era of Digitalization 
Digitalization represents the third and final trend of
note facing both the U.S. and Europe.  This trend
is also the focus of the forthcoming policy recom-
mendations in the final section of this paper. Given
the international environment the U.S. and Europe
find themselves in, why is it useful to focus policy
recommendations in this paper on questions of digi-
talization? Digitalization represents a central test,
and an important opportunity, for the transatlantic
relationship for three reasons.
The depth of its economic impact: The effects of
digitalization touch on economic activity at multiple
levels. It impacts the ways in which industries are
structured and how companies compete domesti-
cally and globally. Germany’s Industrie 4.0 is one
effort to address this reality.29 Digitalization also
gives birth to entirely new industries and economic
sectors within and across countries, such as the
emergence cybersecurity firms and ecosystems.30
In terms of international cooperation and coordina-
tion, it impacts the types of goods and services and
their role within international trade and investment,
as evidenced by the inclusion of the digital trade
chapter in the newly negotiated United States
Mexico Canada Agreement (USMCA).31 It also
impacts who develops and sets the standards for
significant emerging technology and infrastructure,
such as 5G and the corresponding concerns over
Chinese telecommunication equipment makers.
Even when examined through the lens of
economics and geoeconomics alone, the implica-
tions of digitalization for countries’ domestic and
international politics are vast. 
The breadth of its impact: The impact of digitaliza-
tion extends far beyond economic considerations
into all aspects of the transatlantic relationship. This
takes two broad forms. 
First, it spans a wide range of areas of concern to
both the U.S. and Europe. It touches on privacy
and the tradeoff between privacy and security.32 It
touches on how countries fight wars, avoid wars
through low level conflict, carry out espionage, and
provide security for their populations.33 It modifies
how information is shared, debated, and altered.
Digitalization, including the evolution of cyber-
space, “underpins the daily functioning of critical
infrastructure and vital services, governments and
regional organizations, democratic institutions and
public media, as well as militaries and businesses
alike.”34 The breadth of what digitalization touches
is staggering and with ever increasing networked
devices, it is also deeply interconnected and inter-
dependent.
Second, it intersects with other specific emerging
challenges both the U.S. and Europe face, such as
the aforementioned rise of China. Digitalization has
been both a vehicle for China’s economic and polit-
ical rise and now also an area of geopolitical
jostling, e.g., concerns over 5G development and
the implementation of AI technology.
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The evolution of the space: The economic, social,
and political implications of increasing digitalization
are not hypothetical nor are they fully realized. Just
as the impact is evolving and emerging, so too are
the norms, standards, best practices, agreements,
and organizations/institutions that govern—or at
least provide structure beyond those intrinsic to the
technologies themselves—in this space at both the
national and international level. The landscape
emerging from digitalization is, at the moment,
closer to the Economic Wild West than the structure
imposed by the post-WWII Bretton Woods institu-
tions.  As such, it represents an important frontier
for transatlantic cooperation and coordination. A
frontier that is increasingly shaping the economic
and security successes and failures of the U.S. and
Europe. 
In conclusion, digitalization simultaneously repre-
sents an important opportunity or a potential stum-
bling block for transatlantic relations moving
forward. The combined depth, breadth, and evolu-
tion of this space place is at the center of the
evolving landscape that the U.S. and Europe now
find themselves in. 
Just as the transatlanticism of the post-WWII and
Cold War period sought to address the international
environment the U.S. and Europe found itself
embedded within, so to must the transatlanticism
of today. The utility of transatlantic relations going
forward, therefore, will rest upon the ability of the
U.S. and Europe to jointly engage on and address
these emerging challenges. 
OPPORTUNITIES FOR COOPERATION WITHIN
CONFLICT
Despite the changing circumstances within which
the U.S. and Europe find themselves, and in some
instances due to those changing circumstances,
there remain key areas for potential cooperation
and joint engagement. This section lays out three
broad recommendations for maintaining the impor-
tance of the transatlantic relationship going forward.
Under each of these recommendations, I offer a
geoeconomic example located within the scope of
digitalization. 
While this section will reference specific geoeco-
nomic areas for cooperation centered around digi-
talization, the recommendations laid out here can
be translated in the future to a far broader range of
issues and opportunities. This includes those found
in geostrategic and domestic conversations
surrounding digitalization as well as geoeconomic
conversations more broadly. In short, the analysis
provided in this report can and should travel. 
Build Off Existing Foundations
The transatlantic relationship has an almost
seventy-year history of cooperation and coordina-
tion. This history can and should be leveraged to
begin to address emerging and future challenges. 
Recommendation: Leverage prior transatlantic
joint engagement in trade and investment to set
rules of the road for the digital economy.
Joint engagement on trade and investment has
been a cornerstone of the transatlantic relationship
beginning with the GATT post-WWII and evolving
into the WTO. Today, transatlantic trade and invest-
ment continues
to remain central
to the growth of
economies on
both sides of the
Atlantic (see
figure).
Notably, the
digital economy
continues to
make up both a
larger share of
t r a n s a t l a n t i c
trade as well as
g e n e r a t e
i n c r e a s i n g
economic value
for both the U.S.
and Europe.
According to a
2016 McKinsey
Global Institute
report, “flows of
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data and information now generate more economic
value than the global goods trade.”35 In fact, while
the U.S. economy as a whole has grown at an
average annual rate of 1.5 percent from 2005 to
2016, the digital economy’s average annual rate of
growth was 5.6 percent over that same period.36
Yet, given continued deadlock in the WTO, the rules
of the road in the global digital economy remain
largely unsettled. The recently negotiated but not
yet ratified USMCA contains the first “digital
chapter” in a trade agreement.37 It borrows from
the TPP’s electronic commerce chapter:
addressing duties on e-products, intellectual prop-
erty protections, data localization, copyright liability
for internet service providers, and personal data
protection (or privacy).38
The U.S. and the EU continue to have a shared
interest in setting the rules of the road in emerging
areas of trade and investment. Transatlantic coop-
eration in this space would create important
economic leverage for setting global rules while
also preventing other states with diverging visions
for trade in general, and the digital economy more
specifically, from setting those rules for us.
However, “the USMCA is neither a transatlantic
deal nor a biproduct of the Transatlantic
Duopoly.”39 Given the current centrality of the
digital economy to the transatlantic economies, and
the reality that its importance is only likely to grow,
the U.S. and Europe should focus their attention
on extending prior joint engagement to address
emerging and future areas for joint engagement. 
Do Not Lose Sight of the Forest through the Trees
It can be all too easy to become bogged down in
tactical and operational facets of particular issues,
which are often complex both in terms of diag-
nosing the problem and in terms of identifying polit-
ically viable solutions. However, these narrower
issues are part of a larger geopolitical picture that
should remain at the forefront of transatlantic coop-
eration. In discussions of potential solutions, areas
of disagreement should be identified in a struc-
tured, intentional manner to avoid unintentionally
undermining those shared goals.
Recommendation: Create a regulatory dialogue
to avoid balkanization of cyberspace. 
The economic and social benefits of cyberspace
are derived from its function as “a globalized
network of networks.”40 A core shared transatlantic
goal, therefore, is to maintain its structure and func-
tion. However, there are also competing public
interests: notably, security and privacy. Who will
set the rules on data privacy and security? And
where will these rules take effect?
With the knowledge that if like-minded countries do
not set standards in this space other non-like-
minded countries may do so, the European Union
has moved forward with a series of regulatory
frameworks to set the rules of the road in cyber-
space. One central example is the General Data
Protection Regulation (GDPR). GDPR has taken
an important step toward centering privacy
concerns in our approaches to digitalization. But it
has also opened the door to the other regional or
national articulations of privacy regulations. In so
doing, it provided an opportunity for those articula-
tions to potentially balkanize cyberspace by placing
untenable burdens on companies that span
multiple countries, regions, or regulatory blocs. 
National or regional solutions to balancing
competing concerns in digitalization can have the
unintended consequence of undermining the orig-
inal benefits of digitalization to begin with.
However, opening a transatlantic regulatory
dialogue is an important first step toward balancing
the benefits and harms, while avoiding the deploy-
ment of a myriad of solutions leading to increasing
balkanization. A dialogue should, and can, identify
core areas of agreement as well as disagreement
and when possible, prioritize complementary or
nested standard setting when disagreements arise. 
Embrace the Intersections 
The transatlantic relationship has historically
existed within a series of intersections: at the nexus
of strategic and economic interests and
approaches, across and between various levels of
cooperation and coordination ranging from state
institutions to sub-national actors, and within the
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interplay of core global dynamics that can alter or
reinforce each other. Future opportunities for joint
engagement should be similarly situated. 
Recommendation: Approach 5G as a multi-
faceted issue. It is not Huawei or the highway.41
5G, the “fifth generation” of mobile network tech-
nology, brings with it significant increases to band-
width and the number of connections while
decreasing latency. In other words, 5G means
faster connections and larger capacity. But why
does this matter? 5G is broadly significant because
of the role it plays in enabling “next-generation
digital applications that require highly reliable, near-
instantaneous access to massive amounts of
data.”42 In other words, “5G is what will make
driverless cars, smart cities, and other large-scale
applications of connected devices feasible on a
commercial scale.”43 It is central to the commercial
application of numerous digitalization efforts that
center around connected devices and will serve as
the future telecommunications backbone.
Importantly, this emerging technology lies soundly
at the intersection of economics and security. At its
core, 5G is not merely a struggle over the next
generation of telecommunications technology or
concerns over how to secure telecommunications
across distributed supply chains. It is a critical infra-
structure, the foundation, upon which future digital
societies will depend. This makes the development
of and ownership over 5G geopolitically fraught
because it finds itself at the epicenter of concerns
over a rising China and how to balance economic
benefits with security concerns. 
As a consequence, 5G has also given rise to a
broader geopolitical debate centered around the
Chinese company Huawei. 5G has been referred
to as a “revolution” and a “titanic struggle over lead-
ership.”44 Headlines describe “5G spying,”45 “secu-
rity concerns,”46 “potential bans on the use of
Chinese technology,”47 and “calls for united 5G
approaches.”48 Alongside these headlines, other
articles highlight “staggering infrastructure costs”49
and “a lack of viable substitutes.”50 As tensions
between the U.S., Europe, and China rise, every
aspect of 5G has become politicized including
which countries’ companies build infrastructure and
how mobile networks will be secured.  
Given its broader significance, the U.S. and Europe
have an opportunity to address 5G in a holistic
manner. Rather than approaching the issue as
merely an economic or security question, 5G policy
should seek to strike the correct balance between
economic and security concerns. This requires an
examination of the geopolitical implications of
development of and ownership over 5G. At the
same time, it requires an examination of the types
of security risks that Chinese firms represent in this
space as well as, crucially, an examination of
opportunities to secure 5G networks across layers
(e.g., hardware, software, etc.) supply chains, and
end purposes (e.g., for government versus
commercial use). Over the long term, it would also
necessitate conversations around industrial policy
to encourage domestic capacity in future telecom-
munications innovations and implementations. The
lack of such policy has resulted in Huawei holding
the most 5G standard essential patents in the
world.51
While we are hearing a constant refrain of “with us
or against us” from some, the policy conversation
around 5G does not benefit from being boiled down
to the oversimplification of Huawei or the highway.
It behooves the U.S. and Europe to approach 5G
as a multi-faceted issue and to explore a multifac-
eted and nuanced response.
Note: another example of operating at these inter-
sections can be found in Ines Wagner’s paper in
this AICGS report. It addresses the interplay
between globalization and digitalization and its
impact on the workforce in both the U.S. and
Europe. Her analysis also identifies areas for coop-
eration that look beyond state level government
departments and ministries. 
Concluding Thoughts
In conclusion, while the U.S. and Europe face a
widening political divide across the Atlantic and a
changing global landscape, useful opportunities for
joint engagement remain. At its core, the transat-
lantic relationship represents a strategic endeavor
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to address specific challenges encountered by both
the U.S. and Europe. What began as an effort to
rebuild economic prosperity for a series of like-
minded countries, set the rules of the road on geoe-
conomic issues ranging from finance to trade, and
address the security threat posed by the USSR,
must now adapt itself to a new set of challenges.
One specific challenge of note is the geopolitical,
and more specifically the geoeconomic, implica-
tions of current and future trends in digitalization.
The ability of the transatlantic relationship to
address this emergent landscape will determine,
in part, its future importance and utility for both the
U.S. and Europe. 
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On both sides of the Atlantic, preserving and
creating new jobs is increasingly seen in the
context of the changing nature of work—what is
currently understood as the fourth industrial revo-
lution. For the workforce, this involves three main
points: (1) the potential threats to employment from
digital technologies, (2) changes in how the work-
force receives and continues to obtain education
and skills, and (3) debates about the distributional
challenges related to issues around the future of
work. For example, in the manufacturing industry
this revolution is governed by the interplay of
advanced manufacturing and information technolo-
gies. It promises to enable a significant gain in
productivity through the merging of cyber and phys-
ical worlds in a so-called “smart factory.” In an effort
to strengthen and increase their respective
economies and manufacturing sectors, the U.S.
and Germany have funded initiatives to spur on
this so-called “revolution”: the Advanced
Manufacturing Program (AMP) and Industrie 4.0,
respectively. 
Like the previous three industrial revolutions, the
fourth industrial revolution will include changes for
the workforce. A central part of this is that people
will have to be able to adapt to the new technolo-
gies and the organizational changes they imply.1
Technologies and their remote servicing are likely
to play an increasing role in manufacturing. The
skill set of the labor force has to be adjusted
accordingly to be able to work with new materials,
machines, and information.2 For both the AMP and
Industrie 4.0 it will be of utmost importance to
address how the workforce can benefit from
changes in technology that affect the working life.
There are thus common challenges surrounding
the digital transformation that call for a policy
approach helping to not only stimulate innovation,
but also to ensure that workers equally benefit from
this transformation. In the following, the text will
exemplify areas of importance in this regard such
as addressing geographical disparities, widening
and deepening the collaboration with different
stakeholders, addressing continuous learning, and
working toward alleviating structural differences.
Encourage Investment to Counter
Unequal Geographic Opportunities 
The trend toward automation and artificial intelli-
gence has contributed to the concentration of jobs
in urban areas in both the United States and
Germany, fueling a fundamental economic restruc-
turing. These geographical disparities in economic
opportunity, combined with inadequate workforce
development, add to the growing popularity of
populist parties that draw on feelings of rising
economic inequality and mistrust of outsiders. 
In both contexts, the big cities are growing more
prosperous, while smaller cities and towns in the
South and Midwest of the United States and in the
East of Germany face diminishing job prospects
(with pockets across both countries). Urban areas
are home to higher educated and skilled
employees and good connections to global
markets, while workers in more rural areas struggle
to find attractive positions or companies struggle
to recruit labor with adequate skill levels.3
A range of policies already exist to address this
problem, from corporate subsidies to tax incentives
to the creation of enterprise zones (EZs), but they
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have shown mixed success so far.4 One strategy
pursued in the U.S. is the establishment of
economic development organizations whose
primary goal is to attract job-creating investments.
Another important tool is immigration policy. For
example, Australia and Canada have established
a model that encourages bringing new human
capital to places that need it most by providing
incentives to new immigrants to locate outside their
three major cities.5
Moreover, education and skills training at local
higher education institutions working in close
conjunction with local employers are intrinsic to
bringing more investment and job creation to disad-
vantaged geographical areas. Many of these areas
have high/higher unemployment, but they also
have strong histories of economic success secured
through now-obsolete industries. This could occur
through company-educational partnerships to help
make economically disadvantaged regions a more
attractive place for employers to locate. One of the
biggest decisions influencing where to locate for
companies is the sought-after level and availability
of a skilled and trained labor force. Thus, estab-
lishing a pull factor to counter unequal geographic
opportunities is one means of distributing the
opportunities presented by increases in digitaliza-
tion.
Create and Deepen Alliances between
Stakeholders 
How digital work will shape the future of (industrial)
work is still rather unclear. In Germany, a key
component in creating understanding about how
this transformation is taking place and about the
needs of the workforce and management is part of
the project “Work 2020 in NRW”6 funded by the
German Federal Ministry of Labor and Social
Affairs. In this project, management and labor
representatives at the company level aim to
promote a forward-looking dialogue between the
parties and a proactive company policy on the
subject of human-techology interaction. This project
relies on a continuous dialogue between the
employees’ representatives (the works council),
management, technology developers, and project
managers. Participating works councils receive
company-specific process support. This includes
collaboration with consultants, identification and
development of opportunities to shape Industrie
4.0, new forms of employee involvement of and
operational professionals, cross-company
exchange of experience of works councils, dialogue
with scientific experts, and individual qualification
offers. The aim is for the works councils to conclude
an agreement with their management at the end of
the process as to how to proceed with the intro-
duction of processes of human technology interac-
tion in a way that is equitable for both the company
and the workforce. This process at the company
level goes through three steps. 
First, the labor representatives start with an inven-
tory and ask: What changes are there already
through digitalization? What are the effects? Is
there a future strategy for the implementation of
Industrie 4.0 in your company? They find answers
by organizing a company tour and workshops with
works council and company management and
interviewing as many employees as possible, for
example. Afterward, the participants compile all the
information department by department and create
a “company map” on this basis.
Second, the “company map” now provides a clear
overview, based on which the works council and
management can jointly decide how good and safe
work in the company can be maintained and devel-
oped. In this step, participants of “Work 2020 in
NRW” benefit from the fact that they (1) know rele-
vant fields of action, (2) identify change needs, and
(3) formulate possible design approaches.
Third, in the final phase, senior management and
the works council agree on concrete steps to take
in order to do good work in a digital environment.
Ideally, they fix their appointments in a future agree-
ment. It describes how the identified design goals
are further processed by the operating parties in a
joint and participation-oriented process. Preliminary
results from this project show that the cooperation
between management and labor leads to a proper
evaluation of the skills needed and contributes to a
better working atmosphere in the companies where
this project has taken place.7
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The example of this project thus points to concrete
measures that can be adapted elsewhere at the
company level in order to shed light on and strate-
gize about the needs for the workforce of the future
and how these can be met. In addition, the project
also points to changes in how cooperation will take
place within and across organizations with
increased reliance on digitalization. For example,
a paper comparing the processes between the
United States and Germany describes that team
work within the organization as well as cooperation
between firms, policymakers, and higher education
institutions will increase.8 Teamwork is expected to
increase because workers will collaborate and
communicate without borders as they will be
utilizing smart devices that connect them in real-
time to their co-workers and workplace tools as
needed. The amount of different external parties
involved in collaborations is also likely to increase.
For instance, cooperation with research institutes,
higher education institutions, and parties that are
not traditionally considered as suppliers will
increase due to the interdisciplinary character of
digital production. One case in point already seen
today is in the area of digital and remote mainte-
nance.9 Here, service providers are able to
remotely perform service updates or access
robotics systems in a manufacturing plant in order
to react to errors right away. The issue of IT security
will advance in a similar way, as will human capital,
in order to enable the broad diffusion of such coop-
eration. How this issue relates to cybersecurity is
explored more below.
Re-evaluate the Qualifications and Skills
Needed 
The reality of how work will be performed by labor
on the shop floor in the next decades will differ
significantly from the situation in today’s manufac-
turing processes. Consequently, the qualifications
and skills of labor, which are required to fulfill new
tasks, will differ as well.10 Findings of a survey
conducted among German companies show the
demand for qualifications is shifting as a result of
digitalization in favor of expert and specialist jobs
(for workers with vocational training or further
training on the job) and high-skilled jobs (for univer-
sity graduates) and away from unskilled work.11
Employees have also begun to perceive this trend
toward more highly-skilled workers. In Germany,
four-fifths of workers see a need to continuously
develop their skills in order to keep up with higher
job requirements.12 While machines will take over
tasks that are easier to program and automate,
human labor will mainly be needed for less routine
and skill-intensive tasks involving creativity and
social interactions. 
Findings suggest that in the future jobs will be less
physically demanding and instead more mentally
demanding, as well as being more varied and
complex. One of the side effects of these develop-
ments, however, is an increasingly high mental
strain on workers.13 Around two-thirds of
employees believe that new technologies have led
to increased workloads, with more and more tasks
having to be completed at the same time.14 In the
ongoing initiatives of the Advanced Manufacturing
Program and Industrie 4.0, certain areas for joint
collaborative efforts can be identified that aim to
prepare industry for the technology and workforce
demands of smart factories, which are: (1) Tools
and Technologies; (2) Organization and Structure;
(3) Qualification and Skills. These are not exhaus-
tive but serve as examples and point to possible
areas of cooperation.
TOOLS AND TECHNOLOGIES
Through the increasing use of technology, flexibility
in the work process will expand. At the same time,
the complexity on the shop floor will increase as
well. Different forms of smart devices such as
tablets, wearables, or phones will provide the
worker with the exact information they need in real
time or in a certain situation to perform their task.15
Through these devices the workers are able to
control and monitor production processes through
the analysis of data and information supported with
these devices. In addition to that, new kinds of
machines will enter the workspace. The tools on
the shop floor will thus change, altering the tools
needed for workers to perform their tasks in a
notably different way to today’s situation. 
Automation and intelligent tools, machines, and
technologies will advance the need for skilled labor
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while the need to perform manual tasks will
decrease.16 Collaborative robotics will be sensitive
and intelligent enough to share a work station with
humans. For instance, recent research showed that
in Germany every robot destroys two manufac-
turing jobs, but the need for human-robot interac-
tion will increase.17 The study shows that the “more
robot exposed workers are even more likely to
remain employed in their original workplace.”18
However, there are trade-offs: these workers do
not necessarily perform the same tasks as before,
there are fewer manufacturing jobs for young labor
market entrants, medium-skilled workers face earn-
ings losses, and migrant and female workers are
more prone to be based in contingent labor.19
Furthermore, labor productivity rises, but not
wages. Not all jobs are at risk, however, of being
automated; one estimate suggests that only 9 to
10 percent of all jobs in the U.S. were “automat-
able” through “automatization and digitalization.”20
Thus, tasks will change according to the exposure
to automation or digital devices but the exact extent
is unknown. Tools and technologies, which are
available to assist skilled labor and not necessarily
replace it, have to be related to the responsibility
of, for example, the workers in the factory, and the
degree to which skilled labor performs manual labor
or activities such as planning and supervising has
to be determined.
ORGANIZATION AND STRUCTURE
Governed by vertical and horizontal integration and
enabled by cyber-physical systems, as well as the
Internet of Things, the organization of a factory of
the future is predicted to be more flexible, change-
able, decentralized, and not as deterministic as the
organizations of today.21 One profound effect on
skilled labor will be the fact that different production
areas will move closer together. Workers, capable
of working with information and data flow, will work
in more than one distinct production area, instead
of being bound to one. It is likely that production
jobs will be allocated based on the qualifications
and skills of workers but the new abilities the
workers gain through their smart devices will
improve the possibilities for job rotation. While this
is true already for many white collar professions,
this change is also likely to increasingly affect
workers on the shop floor. The workers on the shop
floor will be more organized in different short and
long-term teams to focus on solving problems that
occur, thus having to be more adaptable and
involved in short-term projects. The companies or
organizations will provide an ecosystem in which
problem solving is done in collaboration with all
participating parties on the shop floor and without
much influence of a higher hierarchy.22
Once skilled labor receives more decision-making
power and influence, the organization and structure
of companies will become flatter. That will not only
have an effect on skilled labor, but also on engi-
neers and managers of the lower hierarchical levels
as they need to cede parts of their decision-making
power. 
QUALIFICATIONS AND SKILLS
In relation to the different skill set needed, certain
technical and personal qualifications and skills will
equally become important. The technical skills will
be linked to an interdisciplinary understanding of
their organization and processes, as well as the
ability to work and interact with modern interfaces
and understand data processing and analytics.
These skills need to be complemented with knowl-
edge on IT security and data protection.23 In total,
these changes in skill sets will make the workers in
the factory more generalist. In addition, social and
communication skills as well as teamwork and self-
management abilities are likely to gain in impor-
tance. This is due to the increase in teamwork on
the shop floor and more communicative tasks in
the daily job routines. Currently, skilled labor is not
necessarily trained in these areas as the content
usually does not necessitate their use. 
Finally, the issue of workforce development and
skills is not only an economic issue, but also a
security issue. Human capital is crucial for cyber-
security preparedness,24 since for a cybersecurity
infrastructure to work, human capital is needed for
its support and development. In the U.S. there is
discussion on whether cybersecurity experts
should be added to corporate governance bodies
of private companies.25 Moreover, governments
are also responding to the increasing connection
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between workforce development and security. For
example, Denmark is the first country in the world
to create the position of “technology ambassador.”
The position is supposed to resolve issues related
to technology, cyber, and privacy as well as to
advancing investment in foreign technology and
promoting Danish technology abroad.26
Alleviate Structural Differences
In both the U.S. and Germany there are expecta-
tions that readjustments in terms of skills and qual-
ifications can be achieved by some parts of the
workforce while others may lag behind. The latter
group is unlikely to reach a position to meet the
growing demands of the labor market—even with
further training. As a consequence, income risks
and unemployment may increase for this group,
presenting a challenge to social policy. Due to a
lack of research, however, the extent of this chal-
lenge as well as any potential remedies remain
underdeveloped.27 How the profits of digitalization
are distributed and utilized will thus influence
effects on employment.28
Moreover, the unequal impact that digitalization and
automation have on sectors is most prominently
discussed in relation to manufacturing. However,
these changes also run the risk of contributing to
existing gender imbalances. In the automotive
industry, for example, men may face larger job
losses initially than women in certain industries
exposed to automation.29 According to a study
conducted by the World Economic Forum, “men
are expected to recover more from these job losses
than women: men will lose about 4 million jobs by
2020 but are expected to gain another 1.4 million,
i.e., roughly one job gained for every 2.9 jobs lost.
In contrast, women will face 3 million job losses but
only 0.6 million gains, or only one job gained for
five jobs lost.”30 At the same time, demographic
change will increase the importance of the care
sector, where women dominate as employees, and
where automation is expected to change the world
of work. In this sector, however, jobs are notoriously
underpaid and undervalued, and sometimes work
even goes unpaid—thereby preventing a reversal
of  current gender inequalities. 
Conclusion
Today, humans perform 71 percent of tasks. The
latest research from the World Economic Forum
forecasts that by 2025, machines will perform more
current work tasks than humans.31 However, how
this division of work is likely to look and how the
workforce will adjust is uncertain. While reactions
as to how the workforce should be prepared for
this possible sea change are different, it is clear is
that it will affect the labor market in similar ways in
the U.S. and in Germany. The topics of automation,
AI, advanced manufacturing, and Industrie 4.0 are
triggering a further need for research in various
areas. While it is hard to predict how technological
change will proceed, times of uncertainty and
restructuring also create opportunities to strengthen
partnerships, exchange best practices, and estab-
lish mechanisms to share information vital to the
U.S. and German labor markets.
This essay tried to sketch these challenges in rela-
tion to the discussion in the Geoeconomics group.
So far, research points to significant challenges that
will present themselves to workforces in the future
when digitalization, automation, and AI continue to
affect more areas of work and life. The main recom-
mendations are:
(1) encourage investment to counter unequal
geographic growth; 
(2) create and deepen alliances between stake-
holders; 
(3) address the skills and qualifications needed for
the future manufacturing worker; and
(4) work toward alleviating structural differences. 
Technological disruptions may not lead to
completely replacing parts of the workforce but are
likely to substitute tasks previously carried out by
workers. This will lead workers to focus on other
sets of tasks more intensively. However, stake-
holders at the firm level can best drive the process
of identifying the specific needs of the firm and the
workforce in order to inform policy on how to
respond to changes through robotics and machine
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learning. Projects such as the “Work in 2020”  one
discussed above in Germany can help to inform
the company level strategy as well as regional and
national policy. Exchanges on such initiatives
across the Atlantic can help to improve knowledge,
to develop human capital in order to deal with trans-
formations ahead, to figure out how to derive qual-
ifications and skills that will become more important
for the workforce, and to recommend ways and
measures to qualify the workforce for the future
against the background of the educational systems
of the U.S. and Germany. 
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In fall 2018, the German Foreign Office, in cooper-
ation with the Goethe Institute and the Federation
of German Industries (BDI), launched a “Year of
German-American Friendship.” Under the motto of
“Wunderbar Together,” the manifold ties between
the two countries are celebrated through exhibi-
tions and special events across the United States
(U.S.), a few in Germany, and many online. At times
of political differences, this initiative to “build
more—and stronger—bridges between peoples”
comes at a momentous time.1
Already strained by disagreement on the Iraq War
in 20032 and the NSA affair ten years later,3 the
relationship between the two states and their citi-
zens has suffered a considerable loss of trust since
the 2016 elections in the U.S. The official relation-
ship between U.S. president Donald Trump and
German chancellor Angela Merkel and their admin-
istrations has been characterized by disagreement
and tension, with contention on a variety of issues,
including immigration, liberal values, fiscal policy,
trade and tariffs, defense spending, climate
change, European integration, relations with
Russia and China,4 as well as politics in the Middle
East5 and toward Iran.6 As a response to President
Trump’s continuous—often derogatory—criticism
of German policies and his aversion to multilateral
agreements, Chancellor Merkel eventually
responded with her now famous statement at a
party campaign event in Munich, that “the era in
which we could fully rely on others is over to some
extent […] we Europeans truly have to take our
fate into our own hands [...] We have to know that
we must fight for our future on our own, for our
destiny as Europeans.”7 Other German politicians
have been more explicit, such as then vice chan-
cellor and foreign minister Sigmar Gabriel, calling
Trump in 2017 “the trailblazer of a new authoritarian
and chauvinist international movement.”8 Beyond
the American president, there has been dismay
among German foreign policy experts about
Trump’s administration, which seems to be char-
acterized by “constant change, turmoil and self-
promotion.”9 Also the continuous interference of
the American ambassador into German domestic
affairs has created consternation among German
politicians in Berlin10; Trump’s negative and often
derogatory tweets were met with particularly critical
coverage of his first 100 days in office in German
news media.11
A deterioration of the relationship, however, is not
only visible at the official level; it affects societal
attitudes as well, particularly in Germany. According
to the Pew Research Center’s Global Indicators
Database, after Trump’s election as U.S. president
in 2016, favorable views in Germany of the U.S.
plummeted from 57 percent to 30 percent (in 2018),
and unfavorable opinions on the U.S. jumped up
from 38 percent (in 2016) to 66 percent (2018).12
German views on whether the U.S., when making
international policy decisions, takes into account
the interests of other countries, such as Germany,
dropped to the lowest value (19 percent in 2018)
since the beginning of the Pew data series in 2002.
That is primarily a result of the views of the new
president, whom only 10 percent of Germans trust
(in 2018), compared to 86 percent who had
expressed confidence in Barack Obama during his
final year in office (2016). American citizens’ confi-
dence in Merkel, by contrast, is above 50 percent—
higher than ever. 
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In a recent survey commissioned by the Atlantik-
Brücke,13 a vast majority of Germans expressed a
negative view of the German-American relationship
(84.6%) and only a minority perceives it as positive
(10.4%). Accordingly, only a minority of Germans
consider transatlantic cooperation to be worth
striving for to find solutions to international crises
that are perceived as particularly dangerous, such
as the rise of right-wing populism and protectionism
(31.1 percent of Germans consider them to be
dangerous, but only 3.4 percent think that transat-
lantic cooperation would be useful to find solutions
to the problem) or increasing migration (18.6% vs.
7.5%). According to this survey, Germans see the
most potential for transatlantic cooperation in the
Middle East, such as in Syria, Iran, and Turkey
(18.8%); however, only 9.5 percent of Germans
regard these crises as important security threats.
Overall, a majority of Germans surveyed (57.6%)
argue in favor of a stronger distancing of Germany
from the U.S., only 13.1 percent wish for a closer
relationship, and 26 percent want to maintain the
current form of relations. Confidence among
Germans in the U.S. as their main international
partner has vanished: 42.3 percent of Germans
think China is a better partner than the U.S. and
only 23.1 percent still think of the U.S. as a more
reliable partner than China (34.6% are undecided). 
Other recent surveys reveal that many Germans
even perceive the U.S. under President Trump’s
leadership as the greatest threat to the interests of
other countries, including Germany, and to global
stability, ahead of Turkey and Russia,14 and even
North Korea.15
Perceptions of Germany in the U.S., by contrast,
have remained positive. According to a survey
commissioned by the German Embassy in the
U.S.,16 positive views have even increased since
2003 to now 58 percent of Americans viewing
Germany in a positive light. Almost half of the
surveyed American population thinks that Germans
like the U.S. and Americans as well; however, there
has been a slight drop in this perception from 49
percent to 44 percent since 2016, but only about
20 percent believe the opposite. Almost two-thirds
of Americans consider Germany to be a global
economic and political power that is modern and
forward-thinking. However, Americans, according
to this survey, also understand that relations
between Germany and the U.S. have deteriorated.
While in 2011, 50 percent had still thought about
the relationship as good, values dropped to 38
percent in 2018. Still, far more than half of the
surveyed Americans agree that the two countries
are key allies and share fundamental interests and
values, although they should work together more
closely and the political relationship should be
stronger. Other surveys of the Pew Research
Center confirm this imbalance in how Germans and
Americans see each other’s countries and the
transatlantic relationship.17 Given the disillusion-
ment of Germans with the U.S. and the transatlantic
partnership, it would actually be important to match
the German government’s efforts of the Year of
German-American Friendship with a similar image
campaign by the U.S. government across
Germany. 
However, surveys by the Pew Research Center
also illustrate that, unlike at the official political level,
there are still many commonalities in how Germans
and Americans view international political and
economic issues.18 Therefore, we believe that
dialogue, exchange, and cooperation below the
level of the state between both societies are more
important than ever to regain trust and keep the
transatlantic partnership alive. In addition, we argue
that governmental actors should not only focus on
conflictual issues, but also on common values and
responsibilities to revitalize transatlantic coopera-
tion. Engaging with civil society should be an impor-
tant aspect in both these bilateral and international
efforts. However, as we will discuss later in this
chapter, it also poses challenges that governments
have to remain aware of. 
The following essay in this report is based on the
discussions that the Society, Culture & Politics
group had between fall 2018 and spring 2019.
Many of our deliberations resembled those of the
two groups from the previous years.19 Rather than
repeating their recommendations, we decided to
add new aspects and ideas that our group deemed
important. In their variety, they reflect the diversity
of the group’s expertise in various fields, including
transnational politics and social movements; inter-
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national norm diffusion; development; geopolitics;
international democracy promotion; cultural diplo-
macy; historical dialogue and memory; gender,
sexuality, and politics; religion and politics; and
student exchanges. We grouped them around three
dimensions: reinforcing bilateral relations, refo-
cusing on joint values, and reconsidering global
responsibility. But before we turn to our recommen-
dations, we briefly define the group’s understanding
of civil society. 
Civil Society
We decided to draw on a broad definition of civil
society, understood as “the sphere of institutions,
organizations and individuals located between the
family, the state and the market in which people
associate voluntarily to advance common inter-
ests.”20 Civil society can consist of a wide variety
of organizations and individuals that serve public
purposes, including voluntary associations, chari-
ties, non-profit and community-based service
providers, foundations, non-governmental organi-
zations (NGOs), social networks and movements,
advocacy groups, community and self-help groups,
as well as managers and employees of these
organizations, individual activists, volunteers, and
intellectuals. Civil society exists at local, regional,
national, and international levels. An active civil
society is believed to increase social capital, i.e.,
to deepen connections and trust between people,21
and to constitute a common public space through
participation and civic engagement.22 Among its
main functions are the representation of a variety
of interests that exist in society, right up to influ-
encing the government and holding it accountable,
and the facilitation of civic deliberation.23
There are some areas where the clear demarcation
of civil society from the state and the market is diffi-
cult due to overlap. One example would be
museums, which, particularly in Germany, often are
state-funded public organizations that nevertheless
serve important civil society functions, such as
providing space for public discourse, expression of
cultural norms and values, and for civic engage-
ment.24 Another example would be the media,
which, on the one hand, is based on market organ-
izations, but also has significant civil society
elements, such as independent media organiza-
tions and investigative journalists that uphold the
institutions of freedom of the press and freedom of
information.25 In addition, while it is uncontroversial
in the U.S. that religious organizations are part of
civil society, in Germany this view is not undisputed.
Due to the constitutional status of the main
churches as public bodies, they are often under-
stood as being closer to the sphere of the state, or
at least as being given a privileged status superior
to civil society organizations.26 Since religious
organizations, however, are private organizations
that serve important civil society functions, we
include them, just like museums and other cultural
organizations and the media, into our definition of
civil society. Finally, we found that while businesses
and the private sector have a role to play in
investing in the transatlantic relationship, we
decided to refrain from focusing on the corporate
sector as a part of civil society.
An important point the group would like to make is
that civil society is not necessarily always a vessel
for “good.” Even though it often is associated with
values and norms such as tolerance, civil society
does not have a moral compass. “While the indi-
vidual voices of civil society are part of a democratic
social order, they are not necessarily democratic
themselves—nor are they necessarily responsible
or tolerant, let alone supportive, of freedom or citi-
zenship for some group or another. Many of the
voices are; but civil society includes a great diver-
sity of views […].”27 Thus, when engaging with civil
society to revive the transatlantic partnership, we
also have to seek a mutual understanding about
what kind of transatlantic partnership we want to
forge: one that upholds liberal norms and values,
or one that supports xenophobia, misogyny, and
homophobia. Our group flagged the polarizing
effects that illiberal institutions can cultivate as they
too can work outside the realms of government as
non-profits and non-governmental organizations. 
Acknowledging the underbelly of civil society, our
group felt strongly that the good outweighs the bad,
especially in regard to existing institutions actively
involved in strengthening relations through civil
society. Therefore, our recommendations focus on
ways that civil society can positively impact bilateral
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and international relations given the right
resources, mission objectives, and positive driving
forces are at work.  
Themes and Recommendations that
Emerged from Our Discussions
Through our discussions, our group identified gaps
within the transatlantic and U.S.-German relation-
ships that civil society could help bridge. We argue
that these gaps have been intensified by the current
state of bilateral relations as outlined in previous
sections and have been exacerbated by the rise of
global challengers to the existing liberal order. 
Given our group’s diverse makeup, we identified
common threads emerging from our recommenda-
tions: the need to reinforce bilateral relations, to
refocus on our joint core values, and to reconsider
our global responsibility in the world. These three
“R’s” outline the following policy recommendations
that uniquely correlate with our group’s diverse
backgrounds, including think tanks, academia, and
civil society organizations. We agreed early on that
given the scope of issues we identified, that the
recommendations should build upon previous
years’ reports and expand the range of issues that
governmental and civil society actors, such as the
media, academic institutions, and exchange
programs, cultural organizations, grass-root initia-
tives that deal with minority groups, and develop-
ment aid organizations, could focus on.   
The recommendations aim to address issues
affecting the bilateral relationship at multiple levels.
Some provide very concrete suggestions while
others look at the larger issues at hand. They are
structured in the following format: they identify a
problem, then formulate goals and present issues
affecting the transatlantic relationship, and finally
outline several recommendations for civil society
and governments on both sides of the Atlantic to
act upon.
REINFORCING BILATERAL RELATIONS
The first theme that emerged was the need to rein-
force U.S.-German relations. The group identified
early on that there were strong levels of distrust
coming from both sides of the Atlantic. According
to the results of a recent survey conducted in the
United States by the Pew Research Center and in
Germany by the Körber-Stiftung, “Americans and
Germans have vastly different opinions of their
bilateral relationship, but they tend to agree on
issues such as cooperation with other European
allies and support for NATO.”28 Furthermore, stark
contrasts on collaboration with each other high-
lighted that 70 percent of Americans say they want
more cooperation with Germany, whereas only 41
percent of Germans share this sentiment, leaving
47 percent of Germans to want less cooperation
with the U.S.29 This divergence of opinions can be
interpreted in many ways, but what our group saw
was an opportunity to find concrete avenues for
collaboration that would highlight the values and
concerns that both countries share. 
The Need for a New Narrative30
While remaining strong allies and partners, bilateral
relations between the United States and Germany
have been notably strained over the last few years.
The weakening of bilateral relations has been exac-
erbated by growing tensions between both admin-
istrations as President Trump and Chancellor
Merkel have publicly been at odds on several
issues, undermining the common values and global
objectives that the two countries have shared. The
lack of a clear narrative on relations between each
country has, in turn, created deep divides at the
political and public level on the future of the U.S.-
German relationship.  
The goal of this recommendation is to create a clear
communication strategy and toolkit that empha-
sizes the short- and long-term goals of the bilateral
relationship, finds alternative means of conveying
these strategies by using civil society as an effec-
tive tool for communicating, and establishes a new
narrative. This would, in effect, create a messaging
strategy that stresses the importance of a strong
bilateral relationship by emphasizing the common
areas and values the U.S. and Germany share
including rule of law, democracy building, and
upholding the post-Cold War liberal international
order.  
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To effectively convey these messages to the public,
our recommendation would be to first examine how
current organizations engaged in improving bilat-
eral relations (e.g., AICGS, Atlantik-Brücke, Atlantic
Council, The German Marshall Fund of the United
States, Heinrich Böll Foundation, Konrad-
Adenauer-Stiftung, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, IISS,
Carnegie, Council on Foreign Relations, among
many others) are effectively using civil society as a
platform to strengthen relations and examine their
messaging strategy. Second, we suggest reviewing
past hurdles within the bilateral relationship, and
developing lessons learned and best practices for
future messaging strategies, e.g., by using the
tumultuous Franco-German relationship as a model
to apply toward the current U.S.-German relation-
ship. 
Another aspect would be to identify areas where
governments, businesses, and foundations can
provide financial support or official platforms. This
would include reviewing the mentioned Year of
German-American Friendship and examine the
long-term effects of this initiative, which can provide
insight on reciprocal programs that could be devel-
oped from the U.S. side in the future. In addition,
by utilizing innovative platforms to promote these
strategies including social media, influencers,
grass-root initiatives, and transatlantic conferences,
civil society can be an effective tool to communicate
between the government and the public and help
improve public perception on the U.S.-German
relationship.  
Increase U.S.-German Youth Exchanges31
Exchanges are successful avenues to break down
barriers to cultural understanding. Youth exchanges
have the ability to open and expand a young
person’s perception of the world and can create
exposure to new interests and global engagement
that may not have been fostered otherwise. The
goal of this recommendation is to identify platforms
and opportunities for exchange and cross-learning
that yield a low financial impact but can produce a
long-term effect. 
A recent study noted that the number of German
high school students coming to the United States
as part of formal exchange and study abroad
programs is declining.32 This is leading to a lack of
first-hand exposure to the United States and
decreasing the likelihood of future exchanges or
interest in the country. On the other hand, the latest
data shows that the number of American students
studying at German universities as part of
exchanges or degree programs is increasing.33
Leveraging this growth, this recommendation
suggests to build civil society networks that connect
American university students in Germany with
German high schools—similar to the “Germans for
Hire” program run by the Goethe Institute in the
United States, in which middle and high school
teachers can invite German university students into
their classrooms to discuss German life, culture,
and history, as well as current events, with
American pupils.34 Potentially naming it “The
American Friend Program,” it could send American
university students to German high schools to bring
Germans into contact with Americans and forge
similar discussions in German classrooms. A
similar concept called the “Rent an American”35
program run by the German American Institute
Tübingen, organizes “Conversation Visits” where
students get an insight into a day in the everyday
life of a U.S. student on various topics. 
A potential partner could be the Association of
International Educators (NAFSA ),36 a non-profit
organization with members in nearly all U.S.-based
study abroad programs, to gauge interest and iden-
tify program champions. In Germany, the
Pädagogischer Austauschdienst (PAD) of the
Kultusministerkonferenz37 could use its network of
high schools to gauge German interest and identify
program ambassadors. The Goethe Institute could
provide advice and lessons learned from “Germans
for Hire” that can feed into a reciprocal initiative by
the United States or civil society actors engaged in
this space. Finding financing streams for these
programs would and could be minimal, ranging
from staffing or volunteers, website, network
hosting, trainings, and travel cost reimbursement
for students—but the costs would likely be low in
the larger scheme of governmental programming.
Investing in this kind of exchange platform by
simply placing U.S. university students in contact
with German high school students to foster
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dialogue and exchange on various issues could
create more synergies and foster new cultural
connections in young people that could have lasting
impacts in the years to come. 
Promote Transatlantic Dialogue between
Immigrant Organizations38
Today’s relationship between Germany and the
U.S. has been significantly shaped by on-going
issues that have affected both sides of the Atlantic,
such as immigration. In this context, the voices and
concerns, as well as the potential contributions of
the growing minority and immigrant populations in
both countries—which will only gain in political
significance in the future—have been largely
neglected.
The goal of this recommendation is to initiate and
promote transatlantic dialogue between represen-
tatives of immigrant organizations and organiza-
tions representing the interests of minority groups,
ranging from large national organizations, such as
the German Bundesarbeitsgemeinschaft der
Immigrantenverbände39 (BAGIV) or the U.S.
National Alliance of Latin American and Caribbean
Communities (NALACC), to local community
groups. By creating funding opportunities, govern-
ments, businesses, foundations, and other civil
society organizations can create a framework
within which representatives of organizations of
minorities and immigrants in the U.S. and Germany
can meet and discuss issues of shared concern. 
First, this recommendation serves to include a new
and growing set of actors into the framework of
transatlantic relations and thus contributes to
building a new and sustainable structure for the
transatlantic partnership. Second, the exchanges
between immigrant and minority groups across the
Atlantic can contribute to re-defining the narrative
and rationale for a close alliance between Germany
and the U.S., as it will provide a forum for issues of
shared concern that have so far not been suffi-
ciently addressed in the existing transatlantic chan-
nels. Third, the recommendation intends to shift the
discourse away from approaches that highlight
“integration,” which contribute to the “othering” of
minorities and immigrants, to an approach that
actually serves to empower these groups and give
them more agency. In the long run, this will help to
reduce stereotypes and xenophobia more generally
and strengthen the values that the U.S. and
Germany share. 
REFOCUSING ON JOINT VALUES
Despite a growing values gap between Western
Europe and the U.S.,40 there are certain founda-
tional values that most citizens on both sides of the
Atlantic still share: the belief in democracy as the
best political system and the respect for individual
rights. Working together on these values, including
promoting them and their civil society advocates
abroad, provides opportunities for transatlantic
cooperation despite contention on other political
issues. However, these value-oriented efforts also
involve challenges that governments need to be
aware of when following this route. 
Jointly Tackle “Shrinking Civic Spaces”41
International democracy and human rights promo-
tion are foreign policy endeavors that both the
German and the U.S. governments have espoused
for decades. However, these efforts have been met
with challenges in recent years, including the global
phenomenon of “shrinking civic spaces”: an
increasing tendency of (not only) authoritarian
governments to restrict civil society activity by,
among others, legal restrictions such as burden-
some registration requirements or curtailing
(foreign) funding options, defamation campaigns,
harassment, and threats to property and life.
External actors in pursuit of democracy and human
rights promotion have bemoaned the loss of partner
organizations “on the ground” but have often also
been themselves restricted by the loss of work
permits and visas, foreign funding restrictions, and
harassment.
As a response to these (and other) problems, the
U.S. and German commitment to international
democracy and human rights promotion has visibly
lessened. The transatlantic partners should
recommit to this joint practice and increase coop-
eration, albeit with adjustments. This would require
assigning resources to promote the key ingredients
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of the liberal-democratic world order and supporting
others in their attempt to establish and strengthen
democratic rule in their societies, as well as recom-
mitting to the projection of those values that have
tied together—moreover: defined—the transatlantic
relationship to strengthen the foundations of this
relationship, which is currently under strain.  
In light of the phenomenon of shrinking civic
spaces, the following recommendations should be
considered: 
(1) The U.S. and German governments should
refocus their goals and strategies to promoting key
ingredients of democratic governance, such as
strengthening basic political and civil rights, rule of
law, statehood, etc. But they should abstain from
formulating the often overstated goals of pro-
democracy rhetoric. 
(2) At the same time and at the very minimum, the
transatlantic partners should re-examine their
foreign policies in terms of “doing no harm” as
concerns democratic progress in other countries.
Both governments have been acquiescent to and
even supportive of severe civil society restraints in
other countries when it served other interests. An
example is the strong support that Egypt receives
from the U.S. and Germany despite its dramatic
development in terms of civil and political rights. 
(3) The U.S. and German governments should
rekindle joint avenues for exchange not only on
democracy promotion policy, but specifically on
how they, as governments, can forge promising
responses to the manifold challenges of shrinking
spaces. There is currently no official venue for
exchange and learning from each other’s best prac-
tices. In order to cooperate better and benefit from
lessons already learned, U.S. and German govern-
ment agencies should create an institutionalized
space for exchange and coordination on these
matters—among government agencies and within
international organizations. In these processes, civil
society organizations should be included as their
experience and knowledge is indispensable. 
(4) External actors (governmental and non-govern-
mental) need to more seriously engage with the
criticism raised with regard to their practices: the
question of their legitimacy as outsiders, the charge
of undue interference in other countries’ affairs,
their funding practices, etc. The practice does
indeed raise some important questions that point
to contradictions within liberalism itself—and it
would serve U.S. and German credibility to engage
these instead of simply dismissing them as bad
excuses by power-hungry dictators.
Recognize Potential Tensions between Religious
and Gender Rights at Home and Abroad42
International and transnational cooperation
between Germany and the U.S. provides opportu-
nities to strengthen established as well as forge
new transatlantic partnerships. Historically, both
states recognize the promotion of and engagement
with civil society as important aspects of their
foreign policies, particularly in the areas of human
rights and the furthering of peace between formerly
antagonistic groups. Working together on these
issues is important, particularly given the “shrinking
civic spaces” mentioned above. However, civil
society is not monolithic and we identify emerging
tensions that states need to account for in the
contemporary civil society world. One such tension
exists between rights around religion and gender. 
Promoting religious freedom and engaging with reli-
gious actors to promote peace and reconciliation
worldwide have become important aspects of both
American and German foreign policy. The U.S.
Congress adopted the International Religious
Freedom Act (IRFA) in 1998, which resulted in the
establishment of an Office of International Religious
Freedom and the appointment of an Ambassador-
at-Large for International Religious Freedom within
the Department of State, and which legally obliges
them to monitor religious persecution and discrim-
ination worldwide through annual reporting about
religious freedom in the world. Since 2015, a
Special Advisor for Religious Minorities in the Near
East and South/Central Asia has led State
Department efforts to address the situation of reli-
gious minorities in these regions. In addition, the
U.S. Department of State established the Office of
Religion and Global Affairs in 2014, which, headed
by the Special Representative for Religion and
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Global Affairs, works to implement the U.S.
Strategy on Religious Leader and Faith Community
Engagement, provides advice and analysis on
foreign policy matters related to religion, and
engages in dialogue with religious actors. (The
position of the Representative, however, is vacant
at the moment, and the Office seems to be rela-
tively inactive currently, suggesting that the Trump
administration does not assign much importance
to engaging religious actors abroad.) 
In Germany, the promotion of freedom of religion
and thought has become one of the eight priorities
of German external human rights policy. In 2016,
the German government produced its first report
on the status of freedom of religion and thought
worldwide; and in 2018, it appointed a
Commissioner for Global Freedom of Religion, who
is located in the Federal Ministry for Economic
Cooperation and Development and who is
supposed to continue the monitoring of the violation
of this right worldwide by producing a report every
two years. In 2016, the German government also
established a Task Force on the Responsibility of
Religions for Peace, which organized two interna-
tional conferences on the question of how to
engage religious leaders and communities in
peace-building and reconciliation. 
Given this active involvement in the areas of inter-
national religious freedom and engagement on both
sides of the Atlantic, some have argued that there
should be more cooperation on these issues
between Europe and the U.S.43 In the face of the
persecution of religious minorities in many states
worldwide and the political role of religion in many
conflicts, we agree that promoting the security and
rights of minorities and engaging religious leaders
and communities in interfaith dialogue and recon-
ciliation are important foreign policy priorities that
should not be given up. At the same time, however,
the example of religious civil society also alerts us
to remain attuned to complexity in its intersection
with other rights. Religious actors, whose freedoms
and engagement are promoted, may hold attitudes
that conflict with other priorities of American and
German foreign policy, such as the promotion of
the rights of women and girls, and of LGBTI rights. 
Normative conflicts between religion and
gender/sexuality are well known from the domestic
sphere. In the U.S., for example, religious freedom
arguments have been used to give a platform to
civil society seeking to curtail women’s reproductive
rights and the rights of LGBTI people. Vice
President Mike Pence became notoriously
connected to the religious freedom discourse as
governor of Indiana, when the argument was
employed as a method to discriminate against
LGBTI minorities; though it failed under pressure
from businesses that threatened to boycott the
state. In the current political climate of the Trump
presidency, these arguments have more traction
and have broadened the ability of employers to
discriminate against LGBTI people on grounds of
religious freedom. The affront to LGBTIs—ranging
from bathroom bills against trans* communities to
protecting the “right” to discriminate against gays
and lesbians in bakeries—is centrally part of the
contemporary U.S. discourse. Challenging repro-
ductive rights for women, including the cuts to the
funding of Planned Parenthood and court cases
curtailing reproductive rights (e.g., Hobby Lobby),
is also concerning. 
Similar normative conflicts between the right to reli-
gious freedom, on the one hand, and women’s and
LGBTI rights, on the other, exist in other countries
as well, which need to be considered when
engaging with religious actors abroad. Consider
the example of Egypt: International attention for the
persecution of religious minorities has primarily
been aroused by attacks on and discrimination of
Christians in this and other countries of the Middle
East and North Africa. In the context of their reli-
gious freedom policies, American and German
foreign policy authorities have declared their soli-
darity and met with leaders of Christian churches.
At the same time, however, the Coptic Orthodox
Church in Egypt has been instrumental in
preventing family law reforms that would have abol-
ished discriminatory practices in the areas of
divorce and inheritance44 and promotes discrimi-
natory views against LGBTI people.45
For these reasons, an important goal for American
and German foreign and development policy
administrations should be to take both the promo-
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tion of religious minorities and of women’s and
LGBTI rights seriously, without infringing on the
rights of either group. The German government
already sets a good example by including issues
of gender discrimination and discrimination of
LGBTIs in its report on freedom of religion and
thought.46 Nevertheless, a wider recognition of
these potential normative conflicts in American and
German foreign affairs is necessary, in terms of a
strategy of how both states will deal with these
issues. We suggest considering the two following
recommendations to navigate tensions between
gender, sexuality, and religion. 
First, LGBTI rights need to be recognized as being
as equally important as the right to religious
freedom. LGBTI rights are only slowly emerging as
foreign policy priorities in Germany and the United
States, but have made considerable gains in recent
years.47 The German foreign ministry has a clear
stance on these issues.48 The shift toward U.S.
foreign policy support occurred under the Obama
administration, including the April 2015 appoint-
ment of a Special Envoy for LGBTI rights in the
U.S. Department of State. That position, however,
has been vacant since November 2017, indicating
decreasing support for this human rights issue
under the current administration. In addition,
American and German government and civil
society should remain attuned to the efforts of civil
society who actively do demonize groups on the
basis of gender, gender identity, and sexual orien-
tation. Civil society groups opposing so-called
“gender ideology,” like the World Congress of
Families, are well-networked transnationally and
support states in the promotion of resolutions at
the United Nations and Council of Europe that
curtail the rights of LGBTIs and women in the name
of family values.49 Such civil society opposed to
“genderismus” or “gender ideology” exists in both
Germany and the U.S. and works to influence IGO
resolutions through the support of other states
(mainly Russia) pushing for family values. It is
important that the U.S. and Germany stand in oppo-
sition to these initiatives.
Second, the German and American governments
should engage more actively with transnational
feminist religious movements, such as Musawah
and Catholics for Choice, and feminist and gay
activists and scholars within religious communities.
It is important to integrate their voices into bilateral
and international negotiations both on religious
freedom and on women’s and LGBTI rights. Only if
diverse religious voices are heard, can the alleged
opposition between religion and gender equality be
overcome and a variety of actors be involved in the
fight for religious freedom, peace, and women’s
and LGBTI rights.
RECONSIDER GLOBAL RESPONSIBILITY
At the 2019 Munich Security Conference,
Chancellor Merkel emphasized Germany’s strategy
in a new geopolitical environment. Calling upon the
U.S. to focus on their common values, not just
competition,50 the chancellor stressed the impor-
tance of bridging differences and to work out solu-
tions together in order to keep the liberal order the
U.S. helped create after the end of the Cold War.
As the current U.S. administration grapples with its
own place in the international order, our group
focused on areas that civil society actors are
currently supporting or have the potential to estab-
lish stronger bilateral cooperation on at a time when
transatlantic global responsibility is being re-evalu-
ated and tested.  
Prioritizing Global Aid Effectiveness51
According to the OECD, aid effectiveness centers
on whether international assistance leads to
improvement in economic and human development
outcomes.52 International assistance goals of the
U.S. and Germany are highly complementary: both
are signatories to the Paris Declaration, Accra
Agenda for Action,53 Nairobi Outcome
Document,54 and Sustainable Development
Goals55; make similar arguments linking the provi-
sion of international assistance with domestic
socio-economic interests; and top the official devel-
opment assistance charts for amount of assistance
disbursed.56 Undergirding these complementarities
are civil society interests in ensuring international
assistance is transparent and effective in achieving
development outcomes. However, donor countries
are increasingly more focused on ensuring financial
accountability for aid, at the expense of achieving
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better outcomes. This is particularly true in the
United States,57 and is of increasing salience in
Germany.58
Civil society can be effective “infomediaries”
between government and the public—helping
governments understand what matters to citizens,
and helping citizens see the value of international
assistance. Together, civil society in the U.S. and
Germany can encourage their respective bilateral
aid agencies to prioritize development outcomes.
Transatlantic collaboration and learning between
U.S. and German civil society around research,
advocacy, and communication techniques would
help to achieve this goal. To realize it, this recom-
mendation emphasizes the need to share
approaches, research, and lessons learned
between civil society in the U.S. and Germany to
create exchange about their effective approaches
in aid (academia and applied research); advocacy
techniques (making the case to government); and
public communication techniques (info-mediating
with citizens). In addition to this knowledge-sharing
between civil society actors, there is also space for
U.S. and German civil society to jointly advocate
governments to heed research findings59 that have
raised concerns about financial accountabilities
crowding out aid effectiveness principles.60 Civil
society can also advise government on the types
of aid information that should be made transparent
and accessible to the public, using the International
Aid Transparency Initiative (IATI) data standard.61
This recommendation focuses on a wide variety of
areas that the U.S. and Germany are engaged in,
such as the health sector, the Sub-Saharan Africa
region, and cross-sectoral issues influencing migra-
tion. Ultimately, collaboration between U.S. and
German civil society can lead to more transparent,
effective, and efficient international assistance.
Despite current differences domestically, joint
efforts to strengthen the usefulness of financial and
results information can bring both countries closer
together for mutual benefit.
Redefining International Standards for the Sake of
Art Restitution62
The U.S.-German relationship has played a central
role in the field of international art restitution since
the Washington Conference on Nazi-Confiscated
Art,63 which led to the development of international
standards in developing a consensus on non-
binding principles to assist in resolving issues
relating to Nazi-confiscated art. In November 2018,
a report on the restitution of African cultural
heritage64 stirred up public debate in Germany65
and other European countries and put pressure on
museums to act. Discussions regarding this report
in the U.S., by contrast, remained confined to
museum experts.66 As the question now extends
to colonial art looting,67 the role of the transatlantic
relationship needs to be redefined in this space. 
Currently, the U.S. and German stakeholders in
politics and culture support post-colonial art resti-
tution by sharing the lessons they learned, for
example, from Nazi-confiscated art restitution. They
engage in multilateral efforts to promote a more
balanced global museum landscape where the gap
between the West and formerly colonized countries
is slowly reduced. From the background of their
common experiences and together with govern-
ment and museum actors from other countries,
U.S. and German stakeholders in politics and
culture should advocate for and participate in multi-
lateral efforts to adapt the Washington Principles68
on Nazi-Confiscated Art to post-colonial art restitu-
tion. In addition, U.S. and German museum actors
engaged in provenance research should share their
practices and open their networks to museum
actors engaged in post-colonial art restitution,
particularly when they come from formerly colo-
nized countries. As a first concrete step, the
German-American Provenance Research
Exchange Program (PREP)69 for museum profes-
sionals should, while staying transatlantic in its
core, be opened to representatives of other coun-
tries. 
As more and more stakeholders raise their voice
for a more balanced global museum landscape,
e.g., where museums in former colonized countries
will be able to receive, conserve, and exhibit
52
COOPERATION OR DIVISION?
68329 AICGS_TXT.qxp_policy 11.qxd.qxd  6/7/19  12:44 PM  Page 52
returned artworks, this trend will transform the issue
of post-colonial cultural heritage into an important
feature of international public diplomacy. Germany
and the U.S. can play a leading role in this field
given their experience. 
Conclusions
Today’s U.S.-German relationship has endured its
fair share of ups and downs. Together, the two
nations have been able to overcome conflict,
economic crises, and numerous political divides—
but it took work on both sides to help repair and
rebuild the relationship. Today, as the U.S. with-
draws from the global stage and Europe grapples
with its own internal divides, a government push
for stronger bilateral relations does not seem as
high on the priority list as it once was. While the
two remain close allies on the surface, the relation-
ship has been deeply fractured but is not unre-
pairable. 
As our group discussed and debated the current
challenges to the U.S.-German relationship, one
underlying theme kept resurfacing: the need to
rebuild trust, not just in the relationship, but
between government and society. Our perception
was that there is a growing distrust exacerbated by
the current U.S. leadership and buttressed by
external powers challenging the liberal international
order that the U.S. and Germany helped build. Our
recommendations outline concrete and abstract
concepts that highlight how civil society can help
bridge the disconnect between the state and the
people, but also help rebuild trust within and
between societies. 
As mentioned in the survey results cited at the
beginning of this essay, public perception between
the U.S. and Germany remains uneven, while we
share strong bonds that—with work—have been
able to endure tougher times. The need to create a
new narrative focused on our common values,
transatlantic trust, and liberal ideas is vital to uphold
the values that we claim we share. Civil society
serves as an interlocuter to further these principles
but requires investment from both sides of the
Atlantic if the relationship will continue its current
path. 
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